

# Management Record

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## Introduction

**T**HE RECENT steel strike and the threatened coal strike have again focused attention on the problems of multi-employer bargaining. Concern is expressed in many ways. Some people talk of "labor monopoly." Others ask "are unions too big?" For certain people "industry-wide bargaining" is the key issue to be thrashed out. And for many, the crucial problem that must be answered is that of nationwide strikes.

These, too, are the problems for which legislators seek solutions. Books and laws have been written about them. And the general public becomes increasingly aware that answers must be found.

Besides the big problems there are the smaller ones, too, related to multi-employer bargaining. These find expression in phrases like "local autonomy," "wage rate uniformity" and the "small company problem." To the companies and unions involved, these lesser problems are sometimes as great a concern as the big issues.

If it is to be understood, multi-unit bargaining must be studied against the facts of our mid-20th century America. Bigness is the key word here. Our industrial giants like General Motors, Du Pont, Ford, Standard Oil and many others, through their mass production techniques, have made possible the standard of living in this country of which we are justly proud. Some of them have scores of manufacturing units, scattered from coast to coast.

Opposite the giant corporation at the bargaining table we now have the giant labor union, representing the workers in all the corporation's branch plants, and sometimes all or nearly all the workers in that industry.

This method of negotiation has its proponents as well as its opponents. But how does it really work? Is it efficient? Is it economical? Does it promise fewer crippling strikes, or does it threaten us all with larger and more paralyzing shutdowns? Can we limit its negative aspects and still hold on to any positive gains?

To throw some light on both the "big" and "small" aspects of multi-unit bargaining, THE CONFERENCE BOARD has called upon a wide group of Associates and friends to help put the picture into perspective. A large group of industrial relations executives have written the Board about their experiences in bargaining on a multi-unit basis. They have candidly outlined the advantages and disadvantages they found in such an approach.

A much smaller group of men sat at a Round Table and, through free discussion, tried to delineate these same problems. They tried to find how they arise, and how they can be solved.



This discussion and the replies of the executives to questions on multi-unit bargaining sent out by the Board make up the bulk of this issue. You will also find an on-the-spot account of the election of Walter Reuther to the presidency of the CIO at the recent convention (page 461).

For the assistance of the reader, the following definitions are included here. They were originally sent to the executives who were queried on their experiences with multi-unit bargaining so there would be no confusion in terminology.

**Industry-wide Bargaining.** In its true sense, this term applies only to industry-wide, country-wide bargaining. For years, perhaps, the only group to which this term could be applied was the bituminous and the anthracite coal industry. In the view of some, the latest, though somewhat unwilling entrant, is the steel industry. When loosely used, the term also may cover the next type of bargaining.

**Industry-wide Bargaining on an Area Basis.** This term covers those cases in which bargaining is limited to all employers of an industry within a geographical area and to local unions within the industry in the same area. An outstanding example of this type of bargaining is the Pacific Coast pulp and paper industry.

**Area-wide Bargaining.** This exists where all the employers within an area, irrespective of their industry, collectively bargain with all the unions within that same area. An example of this type of bargaining is the San Francisco Employers Council which bargains for its members with all unions within the city of San Francisco.

**Association Bargaining.** This is the type of bargaining done by an employer association for its members, which are generally in a particular industry or craft within a city's limits. Such bargaining may cover tens of thousands of employees, as occurs when a city building employers association bargains with an AFL Building and Construction Trades Council. Or it may cover a unit as small as a few hundred, such as when an embroidery employer association bargains with a local of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL. (Strictly speaking, association bargaining also covers almost all of the previous types

of bargaining, as in most cases such bargaining does take place through an association; in practice, however, it is generally limited to bargaining for an industry or craft within a city's limits.)

**Company-wide Bargaining.** This applies to a multi-plant company that bargains at one time with all the various local unions of a national union that has unionized its plants. Such bargaining may come about as a result of company choice or through union pressure. The CIO Rubber Workers have secured company-wide bargaining with some of the larger rubber companies. The CIO Oil Workers and Steelworkers are seeking this bargaining relationship in many firms which now deal with their local unions on a plant-by-plant basis.

**Pattern Bargaining.** In this type, while one or more of the leading producers in an industry bargain with the union, the rest of the industry sits back and watches. The agreement reached by the leaders then becomes the basic outline for all contracts negotiated in the industry. Nominally there are many bargaining sessions at different times and places. But the union will rarely accept less than they receive from the leader, and the companies will rarely grant more. Segments of the textile industry, the rubber industry and the glass manufacturers are engaged in this type of bargaining.

**Local Bargaining.** This term covers bargaining between a single unit company and the local union representing its employees. More significantly, however, it also covers bargaining between one unit of a multi-unit company and the local union officials, and is therefore the antithesis to multi-unit bargaining. In spite of the increasing trend toward larger bargaining units, local contracts are still most prevalent.



# Single vs. Multi-Unit Bargaining

A summary of the Round Table conference on multi-unit bargaining at the 333rd Meeting of the National Industrial Conference Board is given here. Douglass V. Brown, Professor of Industrial Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, presided as chairman. Panel members were:

George W. Brooks, Research Director, International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers, AFL

David E. Feller, Assistant General Counsel, United Steelworkers of America, CIO

Hon. Ralph W. Gwinn, Representative for New York, Congress of the United States

Paul P. Milling, President, Local No. 9, John Wanamaker Employees Independent Union

C. F. Mugridge, Partner, Dodge & Mugridge; Labor Coordinator for Joint Bargaining, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company and Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Company

Harold W. Story, Vice-President and General Attorney, Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company

**CHAIRMAN BROWN:** What distinguishes industry-wide, area-wide, company-wide and the other forms of multi-unit bargaining?

**MR. BROOKS:** The thing we are talking about essentially concerns the amount of coverage of a particular bargain. It may or may not include more than one company; it may or may not include more than one union. The most dramatic and most commonly talked about form is what is known as industry-wide bargaining. That means that virtually all the production of the industry has its collective bargaining done at one time and place. That sort of bargaining does not exist in the United States in the sense that it does in England and some of the Scandinavian countries, but we approximate it in the coal industry.

The same kind of phenomenon, on a smaller scale, is known as multiplant bargaining. An important distinction can be made there also. We may be talking about company-wide bargaining (all the plants of General Motors at one time) or we may be talking alternatively about multicompany bargaining or area bargaining such as we have in the pulp and paper industry on the West Coast and in a number of other industries.

Related to this problem is what is known as pattern bargaining. In that instance the bargain is made at one place although the forms are gone through at different times and places to a greater or lesser degree. As far as the basic issues are concerned, these are all related, but it is important to have the various forms clear.

**MR. FELLER:** I would like to underline the last thing that was said. Industry-wide bargaining is a very bad term. In my own particular experience with steel, for example, we do not have anything which is industry-wide bargaining in any honest definition of the term. Although in this last dispute we came to something like it, even that was not complete.

We have individual bargaining units in each individual company. We have individual negotiating committees for each company. Yet our settlements approximate each other. We have, in a sense, pattern bargaining. We settle with U.S. Steel—and the rest of the steel industry signs pretty much the same settlement. Sometimes instead of U.S. Steel, we sign with Bethlehem and then the industry follows the Bethlehem pattern.

But when people use the term industry-wide bargaining in connection with steel they really mean that a bargain reached in one place is the same as that reached in other places, in other plants, with other employers.

**MR. GWINN:** I suppose Mr. Feller might add that industry-wide bargaining as practiced in steel is so vast that there are bound to be a few little companies doing business in steel that still insist upon bargaining for themselves. But when you have one man, whether it be in steel or coal, who can sit in Washington or Alexandria and say whether or not a settlement will be made for a country-wide industry, you have, to all intents and purposes, what we commonly understand as industry-wide bargaining.

**MR. FELLER:** I already admitted that when people talk about industry-wide bargaining they are talking about what happens in steel. I do not want to avoid the discussion by saying that the situation in the steel industry is not what is commonly defined as industry-wide bargaining.

However, if there are steel companies that want to bargain individually, I will say that we in the union haven't found them, and we have been looking for them for a long time. There is a uniformity in the re-



action of the various companies to the union's propositions. If that is what you mean by industry-wide bargaining, then that is what we have.

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** It seems to me that what we are talking about when we discuss industry-wide bargaining is something that may jeopardize our economy. In reality we are not talking about industry-wide bargaining as Mr. Brooks described it but about concentrated power as a result of big unions and big business. The problem is: is this bigness a threat to our economy and to our life?

#### WHAT CAUSES MULTI-UNIT BARGAINING?

**CHAIRMAN BROWN:** What are the factors that bring about multi-unit bargaining in these different forms that we have been talking about?

**MR. FELLER:** Again speaking parochially with reference to the steel industry, the thing that brings about multi-unit bargaining is that the members of the steel industry want to pay the same wage as their competitors. They want to purchase the raw material of labor at the same price as anyone else. And either by acting in concert or by holding off until the leaders move, they studiously maintain a policy of not making individual bargains for themselves which differ substantially from the bargains that other employers make.

In the bargaining of 1949 and 1952 the proposals that were made to the union were identical, company by company, before the strike, after the strike, all during collective bargaining. There were some very peculiar kinds of proposals, which could only come from one place, and they did not come from the union.

In steel we had as great a correlation between wage rates before there was a union as there is now. That, I think, was gone into pretty exhaustively by the Presidential fact-finding board in 1949. If that is industry-wide bargaining, we have had it but it has nothing to do with the union.

**CHAIRMAN BROWN:** If I interpret you correctly, you say that industry is primarily responsible for industry-wide bargaining. Does that mean that the union does not want it?

**MR. FELLER:** I am not so sure that the union would not like to have individual bargaining if it could be done on a basis of equality. The big problem is that the power in the bargaining situation is with the employer. We always do have employers, who, after the bargain is made by the big fellow in the industry, want to do individual bargaining. That bargaining is of only one kind: to make a settlement for less than the big fellow made. The differences in settlements which occur after the big one is made are all on the down side. If we could get some on the up side, we would like to have individual bargaining. In the present industrial power situation, that does not happen. Therefore

we would not want to lose the power that we now have to meet the united industry position by a united union position.

**MR. STORY:** It is my opinion that industry-wide bargaining is the result of the defensive action of employers against very strong international unionism. Of course, you can have the bad effect of industry-wide bargaining on a local level if there is the kind of collusion that was present in the Local 3, IBEW case in New York where the union and the employers got together for their own self-interest.

**MR. MILLING:** I find that bargaining at the local level, as we do, does not mean that we take a lesser degree of wages or social gains than do unions that bargain on an industry-wide basis.

We have been bargaining as a local union since the very inception of our union back in 1945, approximately eight years ago, and we have consummated contracts that in my opinion are second to none in either wages or in employee benefits.

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** Let's return to this power of the steel union which Mr. Feller implies came about mainly through the efforts of the employers. I think possibly he is referring to the "solid front"—that has at times been somewhat less than solid. But let's look at what happened in this union.

Philip Murray\* apparently decided that he needed great power in the steel union and he found means of getting it. As I understand it, most employers were forced to sign contracts with a common termination date so that their contracts would expire on the same day. Some years ago the union also made it mandatory that all contracts to be legal must be signed by the international officers. Local officers in and of themselves cannot legally sign a contract in basic steel. Through that he gained power over a basic commodity.

I am not now trying to talk disparagingly of Mr. Murray. I think he is a fine man. But these are the

\* This Round Table took place before Mr. Murray's death on November 9.

"Any additional labor legislation is utterly abhorrent because all legislation is for the purpose of controlling something and eventually it restricts freedom. And if Congress is going to endeavor to pattern the type of bargaining in this country that is best for the public I am afraid that we are in for real class conflict.

"When you start restricting unions, when you say you want to break up these big unions so that an international officer cannot communicate with the locals and pass along information, you are going to have the same restrictions on industry sooner or later." Mr. Mugridge



"Because of the need for free economy and competition generally, we should bring labor under the Sherman antitrust law, and make unions subject to exactly the same rules as industry. We should bring about local bargaining and do away with the right of any international union officer to conduct negotiations for all the unions in that business. We should restore local autonomy even though it hurts, even though industry may not like it either. We should restore competition and a free market and rid ourselves from compulsory prices and politics, which is what we are getting into. That is absolutely essential to the health of our economy." Mr. Gwinn

which exists when you have a local union with no lawyers, no economists and no staff up against an employer whose resources are many, many times that of the local union's. The only case I know of in which a local union contract was turned down by the international officers was a case where they just plain got taken in: they did not know what they were signing. And I would say that even in that type of situation about 90% of the contracts are signed anyway because it is a deal. And when it is a deal, the international officers do not turn it down. The fact is that you cannot get equality of bargaining power in these situations because of the financial and power situation. Unless the international can help out the local, advise it, and, if necessary, prevent the local from making bargains which it never intended to make, we will have that problem.

The biggest job the international has is to get the local union to take responsibility for the administration of contracts. Actually the only things we ever sign internationally are basic outlines. The big bulk of the labor administration is done locally. Rules for seniority, for instance, are agreed upon locally. Any time the locals suggest that the international take that over, we emphatically say "No! that is a local union problem."

**MR. GWINN:** We are overlooking one of the major factors contributing to industry-wide bargaining. That is government itself. When it fixes prices and fixes wages, that brings about industry-wide bargaining in the very nature of things. Then labor, which is in politics, finds that government will probably bring about a settlement favorable to them and quits the collective bargaining table. Industry, on the other hand, finds that if it comes to an agreement or makes an offer, then the Wage Stabilization Board or some other government agency will upset it. So everybody is shoved into the hands of government and government compulsion which means industry-wide, nationwide bargaining. I blame the government most of all.

**MR. FELLER:** As far as wanting to go to the government because we would get a better bargain, I know this will not be believed but it is a fact that Phil Murray did not want to go to the government this time. If you remember your history, you will remember that it took a lot of pressure to get him to submit to the Wage Stabilization Board. His reason was the union's experience with the 1949 board. We made a strong pitch in 1949 because we wanted a wage increase and pensions and insurance. The board weighed it and made a decision as to what they thought we were entitled to. Then we went out on strike and the ceiling on our bargaining was what the board recommended as a compromise. That is what happened both in 1949 and 1952. The result is that we did not get anything from the government board because we had

facts. He gained power over a basic commodity which we need very badly in this economy even in peacetime. Then through this great power, which gave him the ability to shut down the steel industry, he could bargain with the government. This is pretty much what took place in the steel industry in the last two strikes. The government has looked with favor upon Mr. Murray as well as other union leaders. So we find ourselves in a situation which has come about by the acquisition of power through ways and means that are available to big unions. If and how you are ever going to overcome this is another question which we may get into later.

**CHAIRMAN BROWN:** I thought you would want to say something, Mr. Feller.

**MR. FELLER:** There isn't time here to go into the details of some of our problems with the steel companies. One of our biggest problems in the last negotiation was to get a contractual situation in which the local unions would exercise the power of decision. That sounds very surprising, but it is a fact.

Mr. Murray does not want great power. If you only knew of the constant stream of local union people who come to Pittsburgh and want someone to take the decision power away from them. But we tell them that the international policy is to give power to the local union. In every problem, and particularly in that of the incentive, which is one of our greatest problems in the steel industry and which held up settlement of the strike for about a week, our prime objective is to obtain a contractual situation in which all such problems would be settled by mutual agreement at the local plant level. We are unable to do that. The companies don't want it. The companies want the international to make a decision and ram it down the local's throat because otherwise they are afraid the local union will go out on strike.

These things are true: We do have uniform termination dates, and contracts are signed by the international officers. These things are necessary to protect the union against the obvious imbalance of power



"There is a tendency, not too pronounced yet in our situation, of having policy set at the higher level and imposed on the local plants. There is a tendency of interference with contacts and relationships between local management and local union groups. The ideal, as I see it, is to have the relationship as close as possible on a local basis. The more interference from the top, the more difficulty in working out amicably a relationship at the bottom."

Mr. Story

to go out on strike in both 1949 and 1952 anyway. All the government gave us was a recommendation which became a ceiling on bargaining.

I do not know of any case where anybody has ever gone to a government board and then gone out on strike and obtained more than the government board recommended. Mr. Murray does not like to go to the government and has done everything in his power to avoid it. In 1952, nobody made us an offer, not even a penny before we went to the board. They admitted we were entitled to 9 cents. But they hadn't offered us a penny because they wanted us to go to the board.

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** This conversation is bringing out very vividly the crux of this meeting. I want to say to you, Mr. Feller, that I will accept sincerely your statement that Phil Murray's acquisition of power was coincidental. I do not think he seeks power. But the fact is that Phil Murray and John Lewis—and they are certainly different types of people—have unprecedented power in this country, whether it is coincidental or not. They have power to shut this economy down. That is the crux of the situation. Supposing Mr. Murray were not in this job and somebody else was?

**MR. FELLER:** I agree that the problem is a problem of power, and I agree that nothing I have said eliminates the fact that that problem exists. The only thing I would say is this: Phil Murray's power to shut down the steel industry (which he does not have by himself—it is really the power of the Steelworkers' union to shut down the industry) is no greater than the power of the steel companies. It is the union that shuts it down but it is the company which sets the terms under which it is shut down, or under which it is operated. The steel companies have the power to agree or disagree, and Mr. Murray or the Steelworkers' union have the power to agree or disagree. In both cases, where you have uniformity of collective bargaining on the company side and union side, there is great power on both sides. I do not think it is any greater on one side than the other.

**MR. STORY:** From the standpoint of power, may I ask whether the local unions were the ones that were

demanding the compulsory union shop, or did that emanate from the top?

**MR. FELLER:** I do not have with me a tabulation of local union resolutions which we assiduously collect before we ever go into bargaining. We carefully analyze them at the international headquarters so we can make a policy that fits what the local unions want. I think we had more resolutions from local unions on the union shop issue than any other issue, including wages.

**MR. STORY:** Compulsory unionism is a power element in a national union. Isn't it?

**MR. FELLER:** Surely it helps to make a union strong. But what I am saying is that the local unions demanded it. That was the question.

**MR. MILLING:** In answer to Mr. Story's question as to whether the union security clause came from the top or the bottom, I want to say that our union is a local independent union. We sought a union security clause. We won an NLRB election and secured our union security clause.

**MR. GWINN:** Mr. Feller, what percentage of the Steelworkers took the position that they wanted a union shop?

**MR. FELLER:** We get local union resolutions which are passed at local union meetings by the vote of the membership that attends the local union meeting. What percentage attended I don't know. I do have a better index, because under the provisions of Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act we had elections to legalize our maintenance of membership provision. We won them on a nation-wide basis. Something like 89% of the total employees eligible to vote were in favor of the maintenance of membership clause. That is a pretty strong answer as to the position of the great majority of the employees.

**MR. GWINN:** That is for your entire membership of 650,000?

**MR. FELLER:** It is for the membership in the basic steel industry, which is about 600,000. It would be even stronger if you took in the rest of the membership in steel fabricating because most of them already have union security. Elections were conducted as they got the contracts over the years. In that section of the membership, we have an overwhelming number of straight union shop provisions already. The basic steel industry has been lagging behind.

**MR. BROOKS:** It seems to me that the pursuit of the meaning of power is not likely to produce any results here. The use of the evidence of the union shop as part of that picture is silly. To my mind the demand for a union shop is an obvious confession of weakness rather than a demonstration of strength. It has never seemed to me that a union could be accused of being overpowerful when it had to insist that the employer enforce the collection of dues.



I would also like to suggest that we have confused the issue of power with the issue of multi-unit bargaining. The two do not go together at all, neither historically nor economically. Sometimes they coincide but it is an accident. The most powerful union in the United States—in my opinion, the Teamsters—has no national, area or pattern bargaining. The CIO Automobile Workers have no industry-wide bargaining, and they do not seek it. If they happen to have very large bargaining units it is because the companies with which they are dealing are very large.

There is a further confusion which I think we ought to shun. This arises because sometimes pattern bargaining and the other factors we have been talking about happen to occur in a sensitive industry. Nobody is worried when the Operative Potters sign a national agreement. They have had one for fifty years now. Nobody cares about that one. On the other hand, if the Consolidated Edison local union here in New York City were to strike, you would be just as much concerned about it as you would be about a coal strike.

It seems to me, therefore, it is appropriate to underline the fact that what you are talking about is the economic environment which produces a tendency toward multiplant bargaining.

**MR. STORY:** My conception of power in this situation is the ability of a large union or a group of large unions or a large segment of industry to do something to the obvious detriment of public interest.

**MR. BROOKS:** Our experience in the paper industry is not quite like Mr. Feller's. We have, unlike him, many companies that do want to bargain individually. There is an attractive individualism left in our industry. I would suggest that personal motivation and searches for power do not have as much to do with the trend toward multi-unit bargaining as has been suggested. There are some industries which gravitate toward pattern and national bargaining very readily. There are regions which gravitate that way. We have, for example, a situation in the southern United States where the International Paper Company produces 35% or 40% of the total product. We

make a bargain with that company first. Then our union will never take less from the other companies and they will never give more. There is a gravitation in the South toward area bargaining. This is inevitable, because there is a single price policy, a single marketing policy, and almost a single product for that area.

In the case of a company making a rather specialized product, we want to make a separate bargain. In my opinion, the reasons that multiplant bargaining developed are rather impersonal economic reasons—and not that somebody was searching for power. The effect of large aggregations of industry and large aggregations of union members is certainly obvious and important, but the character of the industry determines what kind of bargaining will occur.

**MR. STORY:** Mr. Feller brought up the question of companies closing down. So far as I know, the steel companies did not close down anything. They simply resisted demands made upon them that they did not feel, as a matter of principle, they should accede to. They closed nothing. The unions closed down the industry.

**MR. FELLER:** That is the unfortunate part. The union has to close down the industry. Let me cite a hypothetical case, not this case. An employer comes to the union and says, "Henceforth there will be a reduction of \$1 a day in wages." The union goes out on strike. Who in effect has caused the damage to the public interest by that strike? Sure the union pulled the switch but the problem always is: What is the relative position of each party? The fact that the union always pulls the switch does not mean it is the union's fault, which is what you are really implying.

#### A TREND TO MULTI-UNIT BARGAINING?

**CHAIRMAN BROWN:** Are we going to have more multi-unit bargaining?

**MR. FELLER:** Mr. Brooks answered that question. Where you have multiplant bargaining, you have it as a result of the economic condition in the industry. Pattern bargaining or industry-wide bargaining is merely a reflection of the concentration of economic power, of the particular economic situation in which the industry finds itself.

It is not on the upgrade or downgrade any more than industry-wide uniformity on other things than labor is on the upgrade or downgrade.

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** There is great opposition to industry-wide bargaining in the labor movement itself. In some large international AFL unions, such as the Teamsters, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters, and the Retail Clerks, there would be bitter opposition to industry-wide bargaining. There are strong locals in these unions. Some of them are financially better off than the international. They have local officers who are well paid and who want those jobs. The workers want their local autonomy and want to run their own

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unions. Many of the local presidents have more prestige than international officers do. You would have bitter opposition to industry-wide bargaining on that score from such locals.

**MR. STORY:** Justice Brandeis, who was a great liberal, worried about the concentration of power. He was thinking in terms of big business. At that time the unions had not attained the strength that they now have. I think Justice Brandeis would worry just as much about the concentration of power in big unions as he did then about the concentration of power in big business.

**MR. BROOKS:** The extent to which we will have continuous growth of this process of regional or industry-wide bargaining is dependent to a very large extent upon whether or not we can dispense with federal control of wages and prices. I have seen it happen in our industry, where neither labor nor management wanted to have pattern bargaining or multiplant bargaining, where they wanted to bargain on a company-by-company basis.

Our industry is one in which the basic process has not really changed in a hundred years, so that you have some very new equipment alongside of some very old equipment. Our inclination is to make somewhat different bargains for different products and different degrees of efficiency. But when the parties are confronted with the Wage Stabilization Board, which nationally publicizes week after week the kinds of settlements that are being made, there is virtually no leeway left either to the management or to the union as to what they will do. When the parties know that all they can get approved is a certain amount, the tendency is to bargain that amount or to try to get an exception to that fixed amount.

We will see a very rapid increase of pattern bargaining in industry-wide and multiplant bargaining unless we can find a way to get rid of controls.

#### ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

**CHAIRMAN BROWN:** Are these multi-unit bargaining developments good or bad? What are the advantages or disadvantages?

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** From the union standpoint, the advantage is that industry-wide or multiple bargaining takes wages out of competition.

The unions believe that wage increases will be

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granted more readily if they apply to all companies alike.

Another big advantage in multi-unit bargaining is the saving in negotiating time, which is highly important. Unions seek multiple bargaining quite often on the basis that it aids union prestige. In the eyes of the union, it definitely makes the union more solid in an industry or in the area.

For companies, multiple bargaining has the advantage of possibly leading to greater labor stability. Another advantage which has encouraged employers to enter into multiple bargaining is the prevention of whipsawing—that is having your plant shut down by a strike while your competitors are running. That is probably the greatest advantage to an employer. Another one, I would say, is that there is a tendency to establish negotiations on a responsible level, that is, with the union's top leaders.

Some of these advantages to companies, of course, are disadvantages to the union in certain cases. For instance, whipsawing is of great value to some unions. You don't have to shut down the whole industry. You shut down one plant, the most vulnerable plant, work out a pattern settlement and then impose that upon the rest of the industry. The elimination of whipsawing is a disadvantage to the union.

Another disadvantage is the fact that industry bargaining is more likely to subordinate local unions and get the union farther away from the members. That is not always true. It depends upon the size and the type of unions and the type of industry. In flat glass, for instance, Libby-Owens-Ford and Pittsburgh Plate deal jointly with two unions representing twelve plants from all parts of the country. They do not lose contact with the local people because they send into negotiations about 100 wage committeemen. Negotiations are a spectacle, with 130 to 150 people participating. The union's constitution and bylaws are such that any one wage committeeman can hold up the whole agreement. In fact, it is so democratic that during tense times, some of us are apt to say that it is democracy to the point of chaos.

A disadvantage to companies may be the loss, in large multiple bargaining at least, of their identity and of their ability to deal on an individual basis with a local union and to work out the problems together. In fact, most multiple bargaining concerns itself with the major things such as working conditions and money matters, both fringes and wages. The rest of the contract you might never recognize in the local plants in many big bargaining situations. It is usually subject to different interpretations. Local traditions have to prevail in many situations.

**MR. MILLING:** Management is far more guilty of whipsawing than labor is.

In the textile industry, for instance, in order to by-

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# Multi-Unit Bargaining—Good or Bad?

Several kinds of multi-unit bargaining are evaluated from industry's viewpoint

**T**O GET the opinion of industrial relations executives on local bargaining *vs.* the various forms of multi-unit bargaining,<sup>1</sup> THE CONFERENCE BOARD wrote to over one hundred executives and asked them:

- Have you had experience with any form of multi-unit bargaining?
- On the basis of your experience, do you like or dislike multi-unit bargaining as compared with local bargaining?
- What do you think of the proposals before Congress to place legislative restraints on multi-unit bargaining?

Of the one hundred executives replying, forty-four had some experience with various forms of multi-unit bargaining and twenty-eight of these had experience with company-wide bargaining. Of these twenty-eight, twelve said that they like company-wide bargaining, thirteen strongly dislike it and three see both advantages and disadvantages.

## FAVOR COMPANY-WIDE BARGAINING

The industrial relations executives in favor of company-wide bargaining were generally from industrial firms that had long practiced strong centralized control in other fields of management policy. To them company-wide bargaining was simply an extension of this policy.

Most of those in favor of company-wide bargaining qualified that such bargaining should provide a master contract, with local supplements to cover special local conditions. How this is done is explained by the industrial relations executive of a large multiplant company:

"A large area of matters involved in the collective bargaining relationship is reserved, by express provisions in the national agreements, for local negotiations between the local divisional or plant management and the local union shop committee. Thus for example, the national agreements provide the rules for acquiring seniority. The local parties, however, negotiate local seniority agreements, which establish the seniority groups, flow charts, and various rules for the application of seniority on a local basis.

"While the national agreement provides for general wage increases, the local management and the local union negotiate wage rates for specific job classifications, wage rates to be paid when employees are temporarily transferred

from one job classification to another, and the other various rules that apply strictly to the local wage agreement."

This executive says that his firm finds desirable the type of bargaining that resolves company-wide issues on a corporation-national union level, and resolves local issues at a local management-local union level. The reason, he says, is that his company's "manufacturing operations are highly integrated and interdependent, though geographically widespread." The giant unions with which the company deals have strong centralized control and direction although geographically they also are widespread. He says that the company-wide method of negotiating with these unions has placed his management in a position to "demand and expect responsible leadership on the unions' part."

The industrial relations executive of another large firm says that he finds company-wide bargaining "satisfactory." His reason is that "it makes possible uniform industrial relations policies and procedures throughout the company. Also the negotiating time and effort is concentrated."

Another large company, which carries on company-wide bargaining with four unions says "the reason why this approach is looked upon favorably is that it makes it easier to keep our policies uniform than if we had to negotiate an independent agreement for each bargaining unit."

A large midwestern multiplant manufacturer with considerable company-wide bargaining experience cites these advantages:

- Ease in establishing and maintaining uniformity in certain practices or benefits, such as vacations, overtime, group insurance, pensions, and so forth.
- Saving in cost by handling one central negotiation instead of duplicating negotiations at each of a dozen locations each year.

## Forced into Company-Wide Bargaining

An eastern company says that it bargained originally on a single-plant basis but that it was forced into company-wide bargaining for two reasons:

"First, the company is one of the pioneers in welfare programs such as pension funds and insurance plans. Most of these plans were set up on a company-wide basis

<sup>1</sup> See definitions given in Introduction on page 450.



many years before the company's plants were organized, and the company's administrative practice covered all operations with one set of rules.

"Secondly, as the company acquired additional plant facilities, the union drove the firm into multi-unit bargaining so that the union could protect itself from wage differentials between areas and so as to remove the company's advantage of scheduling production in one area as opposed to another."

### AGAINST COMPANY-WIDE BARGAINING

Those executives who are against company-wide bargaining cited these reasons:

1. It creates large and unwieldy bargaining units.
2. The company-wide master contract ends up with all the most expensive features of the contracts in force and with a minimum of what, from the company's standpoint, have been desirable features—"despite the concentration of the company's best negotiating talent on the master contract."
3. It has the psychological effect of reducing the prestige of the local plant manager because it is obvious to the workers that policy decisions are made for him in the central office; and employees find they can go over his head by forcing grievances to the national level.
4. If trouble arises in negotiations involving one plant, it forces a tie-up in all locations under the contract.
5. Because the union is striving for a high percentage of uniformity on the various points that make up the contract, it is difficult to get variations in practice for particular locations "even where there are sound reasons for such variations."
6. Meetings of representatives of all the units take up the time of groups not particularly interested in the unit being discussed but who have to stay at the meetings at all times.
7. Management is faced with differences of opinion among union representatives because they are

"The union in attaining its company-wide status has bitten off more than it can chew. The social problems, economic problems, attitude toward company management, and relations with the public generally differ widely from area to area. The result has been the formation of factions within the union—largely on a geographical or cultural basis—many of which have produced strong and ambitious local leaders. The result has been that the tenure of the top leadership is uneasy and its power to speak for all segments of its membership strictly limited. Under these circumstances satisfactory collective bargaining is almost impossible, no matter how much good will there may be between individuals in management and the union."

vying with each other for political power or they have their own ideas of what constitutes good relations at the plant level.

8. Strikes resulting from company-wide bargaining in certain industries, such as the chemical industry, would deny vital raw material to a large section of American industry and would force an almost immediate shutdown of a number of vital industries. Because the pressures resulting from the strike would be on the public rather than just on the company and union involved, "settlement would be by government fiat and not by true collective bargaining."

### Company-Wide Bargaining Unwieldy

The unwieldiness of company-wide bargaining is cited by an industrial relations executive whose company has a bargaining unit covering over thirty states. He says that the NLRB made a mistake in setting up so large a unit and cites his experience to prove his point:

"The union in attaining its company-wide status has bitten off more than it can chew. The social problems, economic problems, attitude toward company management, and relations with the public generally differ widely from area to area. The workers in the South have quite different desires, objectives and attitudes from those in the northern cities. Workers in the Midwest differ from both. The result has been the formation of factions within the union, largely on a geographical or cultural basis, many of which have produced strong and ambitious local leaders. The result has been that the tenure of the top leadership is uneasy, and its power to speak for all segments of its membership strictly limited. Its bargaining committee, which under such circumstances must represent all areas covered by the union, is unreasonably large. Under these circumstances, satisfactory collective bargaining is almost impossible, no matter how much good will there may be between individuals in management and the union. Our experience indicates very clearly that in our business there is an optimum size for a bargaining unit, and a company-wide unit is far in excess of that size."

"In contrast, we have had good relations and satisfactory collective bargaining with over twenty other union representatives with whom we deal and bargain separately. The only feature that distinguishes the big unit from the others is its size and the company-wide nature of its coverage; and I think our difficulties are attributable almost entirely to that."

A decentralized multiplant company, which has strongly resisted union efforts to force company-wide bargaining and which has even taken a strike on the issue, gives these reasons for not desiring to bargain on a company-wide basis:

- Each of the company's units is considered by the company to be separate and distinct in the conduct of its business.
- Each unit is under the supervision of a separate executive who has complete charge of the unit and



who has the right to hire and dismiss employees therein.

- The nature and type of work in each of the units is different and dissimilar from that of the other units.
- Seniority in each unit has been considered separate and has been so applied.
- The interests of employees in each unit are different and dissimilar from the interests of the employees of the other units, and their work and working conditions are dissimilar.

#### ADVANTAGES OF ASSOCIATION BARGAINING

A dozen companies conduct all or some of their bargaining through employer associations for their particular local area. Of the twelve, six say they like association bargaining, three say they do not like it and three withhold comment.

Reasons advanced for favoring association bargaining on a local basis are:

- It tends to take questions of wages and other employee-relations costs out of competition. It also gives the employer a stronger position in relation to the union.
- It helps avoid the practice whereby the union plays one employer off against another when it bargains with them individually.

#### Public Advantage

Definite advantages to the public accrue from employer-association bargaining writes another executive. He gives, for example, "the chain food store industry in which it is common practice to negotiate community contracts. Here may be found community bargaining with teamsters, retail clerks and meat cutters. All companies in the community, including independents, participate in the bargaining sessions. By this type of bargaining, whipsawing and devastating strikes against individual companies—which formerly were prevalent—are kept to a minimum. The unions have become reluctant to strike the whole industry in a community for fear of public denouncement. Generally speaking, community bargaining in this industry has been successful from everybody's viewpoint. To declare it illegal would be a step backward."

#### INDUSTRY-WIDE BARGAINING

Of the four executives who state that they have had experience with industry-wide bargaining, only one has a preference for it. He says that when his industry conducted bargaining on this basis they had labor peace; when they pulled apart, as they did this year, they had an extended strike.

#### Disadvantages of Industry Bargaining

Disadvantages of industry-wide bargaining as outlined by a number of industrial relations executives are:

"Employees work locally and live locally. Bargaining should be for the conditions that exist in the location of each plant."

- "The employees get a fairer break—for what they really want and for what really suits their individual local needs—when the bargaining is on a flexible local basis rather than on the inevitably rigid basis when bargaining is national."

- Country-wide or industry-wide rates of pay and other practices prevent smaller and distant cities from taking advantage of a lower cost of living in offsetting higher transportation and other costs.

- "It has the tendency to stifle competition among members of an industry. It is so easy in negotiating a contract to give in to an unreasonable demand when you know that your competitors are in the same boat, and will not be able to steal a march on you. But what happens is that the cost of the inordinate demand is passed on to the consumer."

- It tends to lead to great rigidity of policies within the group of plants, and thus take away the incentive for competition in improving methods of operation.

- It destroys the autonomy, prerogatives, and obligations that should rest with local management and local unions for the efficient operation of the plant.

- "It encourages concentration of union power and authority in the international officers and promotes all the evils of monopoly. Under existing laws or their interpretations, employers are denied equal power and authority to combat such concentration."

- It disregards peculiar but important differences in the operational needs of individual employers and employees. All who participate in the industry-wide bargaining arrangement are governed by the provisions determined by the majority.

- It holds an umbrella over the inefficient employer and restrains the efficient employer from making as rapid progress as he would if he were negotiating separately.

- It tends, under certain circumstances, to encourage a conspiracy between employer and labor organizations to the disadvantage of the consumer.

- It does not eliminate local problems; rather it tends to make local problems national issues.

- It leads to government intervention when industry-wide strikes threaten national welfare and safety.

#### Oil Fights Industry Bargaining

An oil industry executive says that government agencies in the recent oil strike "deliberately tried to create industry-wide bargaining for the oil industry." The companies headed this off by refusing to meet



with the oil unions on an industry-wide basis. This official says: "The solid front against industry hearings, established by these companies and others asked to attend other regional meetings, apparently convinced the Wage Stabilization Board that industry-wide bargaining, as desired by the CIO, could not be foisted on the oil industry. This position was given additional credence when the AFL Metal Trades Department, through its president, wrote to WSB denying that OWIU-CIO was authorized to speak for any AFL unions on the oil industry dispute. It was further stated that the 'history of collective bargaining in the oil industry has been on a single-plant basis. The craft unions of the Metal Trades Division of the American Federation of Labor desire to preserve and protect this history of collective bargaining.' This is the position of the petroleum industry."

### FAVORS LOCAL BARGAINING

A majority (fifty-six) of the one hundred industrial relations executives replying to the questions said that their collective bargaining was conducted on a local basis. And they favored local bargaining for the following reasons:

1. Bargaining is done by people who understand fully the background of the problems involved; therefore the contract is tailor-made to fit the situation.
2. A more realistic contract is reached because those who do the bargaining must live with the results of their negotiations.
3. The workers will more readily abide by the terms of the contract because they feel they have participated in its development.
4. It prevents contract negotiations from being transferred to people who are complete strangers without interest in the employees involved.
5. Union officials tend to think more in terms of the workers involved rather than in terms of national union policies that might not fit the individual plant or office.
6. "Employees work locally and live locally—therefore bargaining should be for the conditions that exist at each plant location."

The executives who saw disadvantages in local bargaining generally expressed them in terms of the

"[Industry-wide] bargaining has the tendency to stifle competition among members of an industry. It is so easy in negotiating a contract to give in to an unreasonable demand when you know that your competitors are 'in the same boat' and will not be able to 'steal a march' on you. But what happens is that the cost of the inordinate demand is passed on to the consumer."

advantages of multi-unit bargaining, such as company-wide bargaining, association bargaining and industry-wide bargaining.

### SHOULD ANTITRUST LAW BE USED?

A sharp division of opinion exists among industrial relations executives over the question of enacting legal restraints on multiplant bargaining. A majority of those expressing opinions (60%) favor legal restraint, with the greatest number favoring application of the antitrust laws to industry-wide bargaining. A considerable minority (40%) oppose any such measures.

A western executive asks Congress for a "simple, understandable law, which lawyers cannot twist, which says that collective bargaining will be confined to local unions."

An industry-wide strike, points out a midwestern executive, stops trade as completely as "would an agreement by companies to stop production, and is equally a combination in restraint of trade." He holds that union action, like management's, should be subject to antitrust laws.

The industrial relations official of an eastern company writes:

"The economic throttling effect of the coal and steel strikes make imperative legislative control. It is nonsensical and bordering upon the suicidal for the nation to permit the economic strangulation that can and does result where the interests of a relatively few are made paramount to the public interest. Since the recent years have shown a strong trend toward industry-wide bargaining, the need for some effective measures to avoid the disastrous economic results of such industry-wide bargaining deadlocks seems to be self-evident.

"While perhaps not as effective in the short pull as direct legislation against industry-wide bargaining, the best approach is to make the activities of labor unions subject to antitrust laws. Criteria should be set up designed to outlaw industry-wide bargaining, where the result of a work stoppage can adversely affect the national or the community's public interest. Such legislation should be designed to make impossible the situation that existed in the recent steel strike, the various coal strikes of the past, and such area conditions as existed during the Teamsters' strikes in Chicago and New York."

The answer does not lie in how collective bargaining is conducted, says an executive of a large eastern multiplant company, "but rather on the placing of limitations on the right of a union to strike and shut down an entire industry."

### Require New NLRB Policy

An eastern executive points out the complexity of any legislation to control multi-unit bargaining. He writes:

"Legislation to make illegal such bargaining might have been desirable when such units began to appear but now  
(Continued on page 473)



# CIO Elects Reuther—Sets '53 Program

**T**HE CIO's 1952 convention held in Atlantic City the week of December 1:

- Elected Walter Reuther to succeed the late Philip Murray as president of the CIO.

- Analyzed the November 4 election results to find out why the Democrats lost.

- Called upon the "Administration" to suspend wage controls.

- Asked President-elect Eisenhower to recommend abolition of the injunction provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act and called for restoration of the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-injunction Act to its "original strength and scope."

- Called for continuation of the drive to bring back to the CIO "members" of unions which were expelled for Communist domination.

- Called for continuation of the southern organizing drive despite "formidable obstacles."

- Recommended that its unions press for the guaranteed annual wage and called upon "representatives of management not merely to study this subject but to enter into concrete plans" for its implementation.

- Set up a six-point program to guarantee democratic rights to union members.

- Set up an eight-point tax program that it will urge upon Congress.

- Set up a detailed workmen's compensation program aimed at reducing the "insurance companies' underwriting activities in the field."

- Agreed to meet with the AFL on unity for the two organizations if and when asked.

## Elect Reuther President

The election of Walter P. Reuther, CIO Auto Worker president, as head of the CIO dominated the activity at the convention. His opponent was Allan S. Haywood, executive vice-president of the CIO. The real election was not conducted on the convention floor but in hotel rooms and lobbies. Prior to the convention, the Reuther and Haywood forces agreed upon a stipulated number of votes for each union based on what were conceded to be inflated membership figures. (See box on page 465.) As the convention opened, both candidates were running neck and neck. Walter Reuther had committed to him unions with 2,612,154 convention votes and Allan Haywood

## George Meany Heads AFL

George Meany, AFL secretary-treasurer since 1939, is the federation's unanimous choice to succeed the late President William Green who died on November 21. Mr. Meany is fifty-eight years old; he holds membership in the Plumbers' union from whose ranks he rose to AFL prominence.

Succeeding Mr. Meany as secretary-treasurer is William F. Schnitzler, president of the AFL's Bakery and Confectioners' union since 1950. Mr. Schnitzler will take office on January 1.

Mr. Meany's first official act as AFL president was to invite CIO officials to renew discussions aimed at an AFL-CIO merger.

was backed by the Steelworkers' union and practically all the smaller unions—with a total of 2,610,266 votes. Uncommitted were the CIO Rubber Workers, Oil Workers and Brewery Workers. After heated internal fights all three declared for Mr. Reuther. This gave him a pledged vote of approximately 3 million to 2,600,000 for Haywood.

The actual vote was 3,079,181 for Mr. Reuther to 2,613,103 for Mr. Haywood. The unions voting for Reuther were: Automobile; Brewery; Amalgamated Clothing; Electrical, Radio and Machine; Furniture; Maritime; Newspaper Guild; Oil; Radio Association; Retail, Wholesale and Department Store; Rubber; Textile; and Transport Service Workers.

Those voting for Haywood were: Barbers; Broadcast Engineers and Technicians; Communications Workers; Department Store Workers; Gas, Coke, Chemical; Glass, Ceramic and Silica Sand; Government and Civic; Insurance and Allied; Lithographers; Marine Engineers Beneficial Assn.; Marine and Shipbuilding; Optical and Instrument; Packinghouse; Paperworkers; Playthings, Jewelry and Novelty; Railroad; Shoe; Steel; Stone and Allied; Transport Workers Union; Utility; and Woodworkers.

Mr. Haywood was unanimously reelected to the office of executive vice-president. While there was some opposition expressed to James B. Carey in the Haywood caucuses, he was unanimously reelected to secretary-treasurer. The eight vice-presidents elected were:

Joseph A. Beirne

Communications Workers



L. S. Buckmaster	Rubber Workers
Joseph Curran	National Maritime Union
O. A. Knight	Oil Workers
David J. McDonald	United Steelworkers of America
Michael Quill	Transport Workers Union
Emil Rieve	Textile Workers Union of America
Frank Rosenblum	Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America

Despite pledges of unity by both sides, observers believe the CIO is split right down the middle—the Reuther forces having a slight but shifting majority. The question that remains for the next year is how much Walter Reuther can consolidate this power. Up to the present, the real power of the CIO has rested with an executive committee consisting of the presi-

dent, executive vice-president, secretary-treasurer and the eight vice-presidents. In this group there are seven members who favor Reuther, three members who favor the Haywood group, and one member who is personally inclined to Haywood though his union voted, after a closed caucus, for Reuther.

The twenty-two unions supporting Allan Haywood held a number of caucuses to work out methods whereby much of the real power of CIO will reside with the executive board. This board has forty-six members, consisting of the executive committee and one representative from each of the thirty-five CIO national unions. One of the changes the Haywood group secured was a constitutional amendment whereby the executive board shall meet four times a year instead of twice a year as heretofore.

A constitutional amendment now provides that the

### Background of Walter P. Reuther

Walter Philip Reuther, the new president of the CIO, who intimates say has ambitions to sit in the White House, was born in Wheeling, West Virginia, on September 1, 1907. The atmosphere in his home was one of intense interest in unions and labor problems. His father, Valentine Reuther, was an old-line Socialist who was president of the Ohio Valley Trades and Labor Assembly at the age of twenty-three, and for many years an international organizer of the United Brewery Workers.

Reuther left high school at fifteen but he continued his high school education at night and went to Wayne University for three years, where he formed a social problems club and gave its members first-hand experience by taking them to picket lines when strikes were in progress.

Upon leaving high school, he became an apprentice tool and die maker at the Wheeling Steel Corporation. He says he was fired for organizing the workers in protest against Sunday and holiday work. In February, 1926, Reuther went to Detroit. He worked for Briggs, GM, Coleman Tool and Die, and finally Ford, where he worked in the tool and die room for six years.

In 1933, Reuther says he was discharged from Ford for labor union activity. He and his brother Victor then embarked on a world tour which took them through eleven countries of Europe and Asia, including Soviet Russia where they worked in a factory near Gorki.

Returning to Detroit in 1935, Reuther went to work in an automotive shop and plunged into the job of organizing auto workers. In May, 1936, he was elected to the international executive board of the Automobile Workers Union. He has been re-elected to the board every year since then. In 1942 he was first elected vice-president of the UAW-CIO.

Reuther was active in the Detroit and Flint sit-down strikes, including the Kelsey-Hayes Wheel strike

in December, 1936, one of the early sitdowns in the drive that organized the auto industry. In the Ford organizing drive in 1937, he and other unionists were severely beaten in what has come to be known as "the battle of the overpass." From 1939 to 1948, he was director of the GM Department of the UAW.

During the war, Reuther made studies on the economic problems that would confront America with the war's end. He developed a plan whereby publicly owned war plants could be converted to the mass production of housing and railway rolling stock. In 1949 he renewed the proposal for mass-produced housing in full documented form. Approved by the CIO housing committee, it was laid on President Truman's desk.

Walter Reuther was elected president of the UAW-CIO at the Auto Workers' tenth convention in Atlantic City, in the latter part of March, 1946. A few months later, he was elected to the post of CIO vice-president.

Reuther was re-elected to the UAW presidency by an overwhelming majority in November, 1947, and he carried with him the three other present top officers as well as a decisive majority of the international executive board.

While talking to his wife in the kitchen of their home on the night of April 20, 1948, Reuther was felled by a shotgun blast from an assailant who fired through a rear window. Reuther's right arm was almost severed and his chest wounded. A year later his brother, Victor, was the victim of a shooting that cost him an eye. As of this date neither of the Reuther assailants have been apprehended.

Reuther supported President Roosevelt in 1936, 1940 and 1944; President Truman in 1948 and Governor Stevenson in 1952.

Walter Reuther is married, has two young daughters, and lives in Detroit.



executive vice-president shall be elected by the convention instead of being designated by the president from among the other vice-presidents as has formerly been the case. This means that Allan Haywood's position will not be dependent on the will of Walter Reuther.

The duties of the executive vice-president under the constitutional change will be those which he has exercised in the past: directing the CIO organizing activities as well as industrial union councils and local industrial unions. In addition, the constitution now provides that the executive committee shall meet every two months to counsel and advise the president on policy matters. This is in line with past practice, though the vice-presidents have not met that regularly.

The main purpose of these constitutional changes is to afford more frequent meetings of, and to put more power in the hands of, both the executive council and the executive board. In practice this will limit the power of the president.

#### Answer to AFL Unity Bid

The CIO responded to the AFL unity bid by authorizing a committee "to meet and earnestly discuss and seek honorable labor unity that will advance the welfare of all labor." Unity, says Walter Reuther, can not be on the basis of sacrificing any of the CIO's national unions.

The CIO repeats its former position that "united action on social and economic, legislative and political issues could not wait for final agreement on the countless important organizational problems involved in the final attainment of organic unity." This "functional" unity, according to the CIO, is especially important in view of coming changes in Washington.

#### Analyzes Election Results

According to the CIO-PAC's analysis of the 1952 election, 11,200,000 more people voted than in 1948, "with 1,300,000 of this total casting ballots for the Democratic candidate and 9 million of the additional votes going to the Republican candidate." The CIO-PAC says that most reports agree that the largest number of "new" voters were women, who theretofore had not voted. The second largest group were first voters—those who just reached voting age in the past four years. Their estimate of the total for these two groups is 7 million. Conversations with CIO-PAC leaders indicate that they thought that the Stevenson campaign did not get the votes of the women or the young first voters.

#### How CIO Members Voted

While there is no precise way of knowing how CIO members voted, the CIO-PAC finds indications that a preponderant majority voted for Mr. Stevenson. They

say that a New Jersey polling service, based on a select number of interviews, reports over 65% of CIO members interviewed followed the recommendations of the CIO leadership. An even higher figure was shown by a pre-election poll taken for the CIO-PAC by professional market research services—70% of the CIO members interviewed were following the recommendations of the CIO leadership. These polls were taken at the factory gates of CIO-organized plants in Los Angeles, Chicago, Cleveland, Columbus, Detroit and Philadelphia, with 500 interviewed in each place.

From its election analysis, CIO-PAC concludes:

"(1) General Eisenhower's victory was a personal one in every sense of the word. It in no way constituted a victory for the Republican party or the ideas associated with the Republican party. It was a victory for a popular hero, constantly before the electorate in a heroic role since 1942, and cannot be construed as a repudiation of the principles of the New Deal and the Fair Deal.

"(2) Many of those who voted for General Eisenhower did so in the belief that they would not lose any of their present gains by so doing. As it was put by one columnist, many people 'wanted to eat their cake and have it too.'

"(3) CIO members to a very large extent followed the recommendations of the CIO leadership. A reasonable estimate of CIO members who agreed with the political recommendations of their leadership is 70% to 75%. Herbert Morrison, formerly deputy prime minister in the British Labor Government, estimates the British Labor party receives a maximum of 75% of the British labor vote.

"(4) No significant realignment of parties has as yet taken place in the southern states. Control of the political machinery remains in the same hands."

#### CIO Tax Program

The CIO came out against sales taxes and set forth its tax program as follows:

1. Continue the excess-profits tax, and strengthen it by increasing the rates, improving the base period and eliminating loopholes.
2. Retain the present corporation tax rate.
3. Increase the capital gains tax rate to at least 50%, and extend the holding period to at least one year.
4. Eliminate the 1951 increase in the individual income tax rate for those with incomes of less than \$4,000, and place income taxes according to ability to pay.
5. Increase individual income tax exemptions considerably above the present figures.
6. Permit individuals to carry over for at least seven years the unused portion of their personal individual income tax exemptions.



7. Permit working married women to deduct expenses incurred as a result of going to work.

8. Eliminate:

- (a) Splitting of income for married couples;
- (b) Tax exemption for state and local securities;
- (c) Exemptions in estate and gift taxes;
- (d) The deductions permitted for depletion allowances to oil, gas and mineral companies;
- (e) The extension of capital gains to the stock option.

#### Democratic Rights for Members

A resolution calling for democratic rights for union members was passed by the convention. To foster these rights, the CIO set forth these fundamental principles of democratic trade unionism:

1. The power of the organization derives ultimately from its membership whose will, democratically expressed through the established rules of the organization, is the final union authority.

2. The right to join the organization and the right to receive the benefits provided by the organization are not denied to any eligible worker because of race, creed or color.

3. Each member has not only the right, but the duty, to participate in the process of democratic self-government.

4. No worker can be expelled, suspended, or denied the right to participate in its internal affairs except for violation of the established constitution, rules, laws, or by-laws of the organization.

5. Any member who is charged with a violation of the constitution, rules, laws or by-laws is entitled to a fair hearing and trial of the charges against him. Every member charged with violation of his organization's constitution, rules, laws, or by-laws must be informed of the charge against him. He must be permitted to hear the evidence against him and to present evidence of his own. The decision must be based upon the facts determined by the body designated to investigate and hear the charges.

6. Every member found guilty of an offense against his organization by a local trial committee or a local union has the right to appeal to some higher body within the union having the power to correct any abuses of disciplinary power which may occur.

#### Jurisdictional Dispute Machinery

At its 1951 convention, the CIO established an arbitration procedure for jurisdictional disputes between CIO national unions and also chose Prof. George Taylor as arbitrator. The CIO reported that thirty-two jurisdictional disputes were brought to its attention: nineteen were settled before reaching arbitration; seven cases were arbitrated; and six are still pending.

#### Workmen's Compensation Program

For several years, the CIO has felt that present workmen's compensation laws are outmoded. State laws, according to the CIO, provide insufficient coverage and benefits do not reflect current earnings. Their ultimate objective, the CIO says, is a national workmen's compensation law; their short-term objective to secure changes in the state laws. This year, the CIO convention stated that it would press for the following changes in state workmen's compensation laws:

1. Amend the laws to provide for an exclusive state fund for workmen's compensation with the avowed purpose of reducing the "insurance companies' underwriting activities in the field."

2. Establish tripartite boards consisting of labor, management and public representatives and make these boards responsible for administration of workmen's compensation laws. These boards shall establish hearing procedures that do not require representation by legal counsel. The tripartite board's decisions shall bind employers and insurance carriers underwriting the employer's liability. The CIO would have the states prohibit court actions for damages and make the tripartite board's actions the exclusive remedy.

3. Broaden coverage to provide compulsory coverage of all employers, including small establishments and employments now classified as nonhazardous.

4. Establish statutory benefit level to indemnify the worker for at least 80% of his wage loss.

5. Eliminate waiting periods, and pay compensation for all lost time.

6. Provide additional allowance for injured workers with dependent children.

7. Determine benefits on the basis of average earnings. Benefits should not be less than the worker's rate of pay for full-time work, and should allow for normal overtime. The average should be adjusted to correspond to normal increases in earnings during continuance of disability.

8. Pay compensation for total disability, whether temporary or permanent for the entire duration of disability. Pay benefits for permanent total disability for life.

9. Revise the entire procedure governing compensation for permanent partial disability. Determine compensation according to the individual's loss of earning capacity, including general physical efficiency, taking into account such factors as the worker's age and wages.

10. Pay compensation for fatal injuries during the dependency of eligible survivors; should not be subject to any arbitrary expiration of benefits.

*(Continued on page 466)*



## What Is CIO's Membership?

What is the CIO's real membership? For publicity purposes, the CIO says "at the present time it is approximately six million." And in assigning convention votes to the thirty-five CIO unions and organizing committees, the CIO came up with the figure of 5,612,687. That this was an inflated figure soon became apparent. Criticisms of the voting strength assigned to unions in the opposing camps were made by both the Reuther and Haywood factions.

The CIO's 1951 financial report indicates that the CIO office was paid per capita taxes on a membership of 4,082,222.<sup>1</sup> (This compares with the AFL's paid membership of 8,098,302 for 1952.) But the CIO national unions, by tacit agreement among themselves, do not pay their yearly \$1.20 per capita tax on their full membership. They only pay on an arbitrary figure which is less than their true membership. The 4,082,222 membership indicated by the financial report is there-

fore too low. The true membership figure lies somewhere between 4,082,222 and the inflated 5,612,687 used for voting purposes at the convention. Informed estimates place it in the neighborhood of 4,500,000.

The voting strength figures for CIO unions and organizing committees in the 1952 convention and the membership figures indicated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, THE CONFERENCE BOARD and other sources are given below:

<sup>1</sup> This figure is based on the AFL's analysis of the CIO financial statement for the year ending September 30, 1951. The CIO statement showed income of \$4,898,662 from per capita dues. The CIO's per capita tax is 10 cents a month for each member, or \$1.20 a year. This amount, the AFL says, divided into the CIO's \$4,898,662 per capita income for 1951 gives 4,082,222 paid members. See "AFL Analyzes CIO Financial Statement" *Management Record*, March, 1952, p. 103.

Union	Voting Strength in 1952 Convention	Membership as Indicated by Other Sources
Automobile Workers	1,409,125	1,180,284 <sup>4</sup>
Barbers and Beauty Culturists	5,311	.... <sup>2</sup>
Brewery	78,844	50,000 <sup>1</sup>
Broadcast Engineers	5,250	2,400 <sup>1</sup>
Amalgamated Clothing Workers	283,500	294,770 <sup>6</sup>
Communications Workers (Telephone)	306,761	207,665 <sup>7</sup>
Department Store Organizing Committee	13,600	.... <sup>2</sup>
Electrical Workers (IUE-CIO)	317,655	238,999 <sup>8</sup>
Furniture Workers	54,710	45,000 <sup>1</sup>
Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers	95,691	35,296 <sup>9</sup>
Glass Workers	58,683	34,000 <sup>1</sup>
Government and Civic Em- ployees Organizing Committee	40,795	.... <sup>2</sup>
Insurance and Allied Workers Organizing Committee	12,665	.... <sup>2</sup>
Lithographers	4,160	24,088 <sup>1</sup>
Marine Engineers	17,049	13,500 <sup>1</sup>
Marine and Shipbuilding Workers	54,610	86,605 <sup>1</sup> (1948)

Union	Voting Strength in 1952 Convention	Membership as Indicated by Other Sources
National Maritime Union	61,884	34,836 <sup>10</sup>
Newspaper Guild	32,579	20,651 <sup>11</sup>
Oil Workers	118,364	77,899 <sup>1</sup> (1948)
Optical Workers	8,750	.... <sup>2</sup>
Packinghouse Workers	164,159	109,563 <sup>12</sup>
Paperworkers	57,426	39,000 <sup>1</sup>
Playthings, Jewelry and Nov- elty Workers	34,117	35,312 <sup>1</sup>
Radio Association	2,700	1,600 <sup>1</sup>
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store	77,580	65,000 <sup>1</sup>
United Railroad Workers	20,321	.... <sup>2</sup>
Rubber Workers	236,074	150,070 <sup>1</sup>
Shoe Workers	77,163	67,000 <sup>1</sup>
Steelworkers	1,227,230	1,068,000 <sup>5</sup>
Stone	18,739	.... <sup>2</sup>
Textile	408,200	300,949 <sup>13</sup>
Transport Service Employees (Red Caps)	5,250	.... <sup>2</sup>
Transport Workers	93,000	.... <sup>2</sup>
Utility Workers	79,569	75,000 <sup>1</sup>
Woodworkers	133,673	90,000 <sup>14</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bulletin 980. United States Department of Labor, Directory of Labor Unions in the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Figures not available.

<sup>3</sup> Textile Union was split by Baldanzi switch to AFL Textile Workers. Union lost between 25,000 to 50,000 workers to AFL, see "AFL vs. CIO Textile Fight—A Survey" September, 1952, *Management Record*, p. 346.

<sup>4</sup> Average dues paying membership in UAW-CIO for fiscal year ending May 31, 1952. See October, 1952, *Management Record*, p. 394.

<sup>5</sup> The CIO Steelworkers' official publication *Steel Labor* stated that for the six months ending December 31, 1951, the union had 1,068,000 members. This figure, the union explained, includes members who do not pay dues for reasons authorized by the constitution. See *Management Record*, July, 1952, p. 279.

<sup>6</sup> Amalgamated Clothing Workers financial statement shows per capita for year ended December 31, 1951, was \$3,006,659.93. This divided by 85 cents per month, or \$10.20 per year, indicates 294,770 paid members.

<sup>7</sup> Communications Workers per capita \$3,737,974.20 for year ending April 30, 1952, divided by \$1.50 per month indicates 207,665 paid members.

<sup>8</sup> Electrical Workers (IUE-CIO) per capita for year ending September 30, 1952, \$2,150,999.55 divided by 75 cents per month (\$9 a year) indicates 238,999 paid members.

<sup>9</sup> Gas, Coke & Chemical Workers, \$423,547.91 for year ending January 31, 1950, divided by \$1 per month indicates 35,296 paid members.

<sup>10</sup> National Maritime Union dues for April, 1950, was \$139,344.54 divided by \$4 dues indicates 34,836 members for that month.

<sup>11</sup> Newspaper Guild per capita for quarter ending April 30, 1950, \$86,735.10 divided by \$1.40 per month (or \$4.20 for quarter) indicates 20,651 paid members.

<sup>12</sup> Packinghouse Workers per capita of \$1,314,758.07 for year ending December 31, 1951, divided by \$1 per month indicates 109,563 paid members.

<sup>13</sup> Textile Workers per capita of \$3,611,384.09 for year ending February 29, 1952, divided by \$1 per month per capita indicates 300,949 paid members.

<sup>14</sup> Woodworkers' financial statement for year ending June 30, 1952, shows CIO and CCL per capita of \$109,939.30. This would indicate per capita payments on approximately 90,000 members.



11. Pay worker sustaining a second injury which aggravates a pre-existing condition, compensation based on the full severity of disability after the second injury. Set up second injury funds to finance the additional cost of such benefits.

12. Pay compensation for injuries which disfigure an employee by scarring or misshaping some member of his body.

13. Make occupational diseases fully compensable without total maximum benefit amounts or maximum benefit periods.

14. Make all personal injuries or diseases arising out of employment subject to the workmen's compensation law, including those which are incurred

"without a history of an unusual violent accident."

15. Do not make medical care subject to arbitrary maximums on money or time. Provide that medical care must cover all services necessary for maximum restoration of the worker to health and include prosthetic devices.

16. Include adequate income maintenance during rehabilitation measures to restore the injured worker to maximum capacity. Include time spent in training in the use of prosthetic devices, if necessary, and in the acquisition or development of useful, suitable and remunerative vocational skills.

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## Trends in

# LABOR RELATIONS

## Act on False Red Oath

Five-and-one-half years after the Taft-Hartley Act's noncommunist oath was made law, the Department of Justice secured its first conviction for a false oath and the NLRB took action against the unions in which the offender was an officer. The man involved was Anthony Valentino. He was convicted in the United States District Court in Camden, New Jersey, of filing a false noncommunist affidavit.

As a follow-up to the court conviction, the NLRB took steps to revoke the certification of three labor organizations for which the convicted Anthony Valentino had filed as business manager: Local 80, Food and Tobacco Workers; Local Industrial Union, 80, CIO; and Local 80-A, United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO. The three local unions were ordered to "show cause" why their certifications covering five New Jersey plants should not be revoked.

In a separate proceeding, the NLRB also revoked the compliance status of Local 80-A, United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO. The union's current compliance status was based upon an affidavit filed by Anthony Valentino. This means that the union cannot utilize the services of the NLRB in elections and unfair labor practice cases. In the case of the other two local unions, the past affidavits, and not current affidavits, of Mr. Valentino were involved.

Although more than 232,000 noncommunist affidavits are on file, covering 25,935 national and local unions, Mr. Valentino is the first person convicted of filing a false affidavit. The CIO in 1949 expelled eleven national unions and their affiliated local unions on charges of Communist domination. The national and

local union officials of these unions have signed non-communist affidavits—in some cases immediately after they announced in the Communist party's *Daily Worker* that they had officially resigned from the party but would continue to believe in its principles. The NLRB takes the position that it is not its function to judge the truth or falsity of noncommunist affidavits. It can only refer these affidavits to the Department of Justice for action, and it is up to the courts to determine whether a person has filed a false affidavit. At the present time the Department of Justice has obtained three other indictments: two in Ohio involving local union officials of the United Electrical Workers (UE), ind., and one in Detroit involving a local official of the United Packinghouse Workers, CIO.

## No Bargaining During Slowdown

The NLRB in its first action on the issue ruled unanimously that an employer does not have to bargain during a slowdown. The ruling was made in the case of the Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation and the CIO Electrical Workers. The company had refused to bargain with the union during a six-day slowdown. The NLRB upheld the company, saying that the employer's normal duty to bargain with the union was suspended during the slowdown because the union's action in calling a slowdown constituted "an absence of fair dealing." The board pointed out that while the company did not discharge any employees for participating in the slowdown, it would



have had the right to do so "under established board and court precedents."

In handing down its decision, the NLRB said:

"By engaging in the slowdown, the union subjected the respondent (company) to a partial strike designed to bring pressure for acceptance of its terms. The union was unwilling to choose between working under the existing terms of employment and engaging in a total strike with the loss of wages and risk of lawful replacement incident thereto. Instead it engaged in a harassing tactic irreconcilable with the act's requirement of reasoned discussion in a background of balanced bargaining relations upon which good faith bargaining must rest. Accordingly, whether or not the respondent (company) exercised its right to discharge the participants, we believe the authorized slowdown negated the existence of honest and sincere dealing in the union's contemporaneous request to negotiate. In these circumstances, the respondent (company) was not required to indulge in the futile gesture of honoring the union's request. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the (company's) normal obligation to bargain was suspended, and that it did not violate Section 8(a)(5) of the act by refusing to bargain during the period of the slowdown."

## NLRB Rules on Seniority as Basis of Union Security

The general counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, George J. Bott, has made the first administrative decision covering the use of seniority as a means of gaining union security. His administrative decision deals with an unnamed brewing company and an unnamed union. They had signed a seniority clause which Mr. Bott described as granting "a preference in employment to those persons who had been employed in the industry during particular periods in the past when the closed-shop contract had been enforced."

The NLRB general counsel refused to declare this an unfair labor practice. In making the ruling he cited the NLRB decision of 1950 which upheld the contract of Marine Cooks and Stewards Union, and the Pacific American Shipowners Association. This contract provided a hiring hall, and gave preference to employees who had accrued seniority under a previous preferential hiring contract.

Shortly after passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Sailors Union of the Pacific, AFL, included a similar provision in its contract with the Pacific Coast shipping companies. At that time, Senator Taft, in a letter to THE CONFERENCE BOARD, disclosed that he had met with the union leader and the employer association and had expressed the opinion "that preference for applicants previously employed was entirely legal, and not different from many existing seniority rules."

The union believed that through the above clause it had achieved something very close to its regular hir-

ing hall procedure which gave preference to union members. Since most of the union's members had been in the industry for some time, any arrangement that gave preference to those in the industry was in effect giving preference to union members.<sup>1</sup>

## C. P. Membership Cause for Discharge

"Membership in the Communist party" is listed as a cause for discharge in a West Coast utility company's contract with the CIO Utility Workers Union. The contract also provides that employees discharged for "advocacy of the overthrow of the government by force and violence, or commission of or conspiracy to commit any act of sabotage . . . shall not be entitled to a termination wage."

## Quarantined Worker Paid

If an employee is paid when he is sick what happens if he is not sick but is quarantined because someone in his household is sick? He gets paid anyway, according to the Michigan Bell Telephone Company's agreement with the CIO Communications Workers:

"In cases where the medical department approves, payment to the same extent as though the absence were caused by personal illness will be made for unavoidable absence due to quarantine because of a contagious disease in an employee's immediate household."

## Government Security Clause

When the management takes on "classified" work, its actions thenceforth are not always its own: the government, for example, may step in and order certain workers off the job for security reasons. Such action is permitted under the following clause:

"The union recognizes that the company has certain obligations in its contracts with the government pertaining to security, and agrees that nothing contained in this contract is intended to place the company in violation of its security agreements with the government. Therefore, in the event that the United States Air Force or any other government agency concerned with \_\_\_\_\_ Corporation security regulations, advises the company that any member of Production Engineering Technical Association is restricted from work on or access to classified information or material, the union will not contest any action the company may reasonably take to comply with its security obligations to the government."

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<sup>1</sup> See "Union Security and Checkoff Provisions," *Studies in Personnel Policy*, No. 127, page 61.



## LABOR'S POST-ELECTION OUTLOOK

EISENHOWER'S victory commanded attention of all labor journals last month as all sought answers to the question, "What happens now?" The consensus seems to be that the outlook is bleak, but not black. Most labor papers emphasize that unions can look for legislative changes in the Taft-Hartley Act. They differ on how restrictive these changes might be. Some papers emphasize that unions will have to fall back on organizational drives to strengthen themselves. A few were already talking of the 1954 congressional elections. The AFL and other unions' papers, however, expressed confidence that President-elect Eisenhower "will do his utmost to carry out his pledge to be fair and just to Americans in all walks of life." A sampling of statements from labor papers shows views both pessimistic and not so pessimistic.

### The CIO News (Congress of Industrial Organizations)

"The CIO has no alibis about this election. It does not intend to whine or whimper because the man we endorsed was defeated. . . .

"The party of Abraham Lincoln has not always been antilabor, and it need not be so. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the harassing labor record of many of the Senators and Congressmen who were reelected.

"Labor was not an issue in the 1952 election. Both party platforms recognized the inherent right of unions to organize and to engage in collective bargaining. If President Eisenhower and the GOP leaders in Congress are faithful to the concept expounded in their platform, relations between labor and management can be harmonious and constructive. If, on the other hand, the hate-labor block is given free rein, workers will suffer and so will the entire nation."

### AFL News Reporter (American Federation of Labor)

"What can labor expect from the new administration?

"Trade unionists can perhaps derive a clue as to what President-elect Eisenhower will do regarding labor legislation from what he told the American Federation of Labor convention in New York City last September. Regarding the Taft-Hartley Act, the general said:

"I am in favor, not of repealing, but of amending that law.

"I will not support any amendment which weak-

ens the rights of working men and women. Seeking desirable amendments, I will ask the advice and suggestions of all groups—public, management and labor. I assure you that this invitation of mine will be genuine and in good faith."

### Labor (fifteen railroad labor unions, AFL, Ind.)

"Of course, there will be no change in the Taft-Hartley Act remotely favorable to labor. Taft has been talking about 'strengthening' the law, by both prohibiting industry-wide bargaining and making it infinitely harder to get a union shop. He can command overwhelming majorities in both houses for granting him antilabor suggestions. Will Ike go along? Time will tell."

### The Paper Maker (International Brotherhood of Paper Makers, AFL)

"A provision [banning industry-wide bargaining] was in the original house version of the Taft-Hartley Law but Senator Taft was instrumental in having it eliminated. Whether Taft was genuinely opposed to it or opposed it simply because it might hold up passage of the law is in the realm of conjecture. But the fact stands that he opposed it and lobbyists for the provision would have to beat down Taft as chairman of the Senate Labor Committee to get it through."

### Textile Labor (Textile Workers Union of America, CIO)

"For us in the TWUA-CIO, the meaning of the election is clear. Now we really have to build our union—or be destroyed.

"No longer can we count on a friendly or even courteous hearing in Washington. No longer can we dream of a government which believes in collective bargaining. For the next four years at least, we're on our own.

"All of us—rank and file members, officers and staff—must recapture all the energy, the devotion and self-sacrifice which made our union great; for the odds against us will be the heaviest we have endured since the CIO was born." (For other TWUA-CIO problems, see next page.)

### The Machinist (International Association of Machinists, AFL)

"We should plan our activities on the assumption that nobody is going to defend our rights as em-



employees and nobody is going to negotiate a fair deal for us unless we are prepared and able to defend ourselves.

"We must assume that the new administration in Washington is going to be less concerned with our problems than the administrations of the last twenty years." (A. J. Hayes, IAM president, went on to ask the members to seek 100% membership in every shop where the IAM now holds bargaining rights.)

#### The IUE-CIO News (International Union of Electrical Workers, CIO)

"Organized labor intends to render every positive assistance to help the new president and the new administration carry out its responsibilities. We will have a clear understanding of the administration's ability to carry out its pledges by the 1954 election."

#### The NMU Pilot (National Maritime Union, CIO)

"The labor movement must not, and cannot, take the position that this defeat represents anything other than a temporary setback. Neither Taft, who will be the nominal leader in Washington in this Republican victory, nor anyone else will be able to take away any of the social or economic gains made by the American people in the last twenty years, without a tremendous struggle developing."

#### Lewis Declines Life-Time Term Presidency

Resolutions urging that John L. Lewis be made permanent president of the United Mine Workers were opposed by Mr. Lewis at the Mine Workers' recent convention, reports the *United Mine Workers' Journal*. Mr. Lewis stated: "I want the rules of the organization to apply to me just like they do to every other member, and I will take a chance with you when the regular elections come around as to whether you want to elect me." UMW Vice-President Kennedy followed Mr. Lewis on the rostrum with the statement: "Whether by election or otherwise, John L. Lewis will be with us as president during the rest of his natural life."

#### AFL Receipts Top \$3.5 Million

AFL income amounted to \$3,621,118.60 for the nine-month period ending June 30, 1952, according to a financial report in *The American Federationist*. Of this total, \$2,999,991.04 came from per capita taxes. AFL expenditures during the period amounted to almost \$3.5 million.

#### Engineer Scientists Form New Unit

Twenty-five small independent professional groups are now in the process of becoming affiliated with the newly organized Engineers and Scientists of America, reports *The Council Compass*, published by a small independent professional union. By the end of 1953, the ESA expects to

represent 40,000 professional employees, according to this source. The Engineers and Scientists of America, ind., represents a merger of the Council of Engineering and Scientific Employees, the National Professional Association, and the Engineers Architects Association. The primary purpose of the organization, reports *The Council Compass*, is to organize units of nonsupervisory professional employees. The ESA has no connection with the AFL's International Federation of Technical Engineers.

#### AFL Textile Union Wins in South, Looks North

By defeating the Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, in an election among 11,000 workers at the Dan River Mills, the United Textile Workers of America, AFL claims it is the dominant textile union in the South, according to *The Textile Challenger*. The Dan River vote was UTW-AFL—7,869; TWUA-CIO—278; no union—1,624. The victory is viewed by the AFL union as a spur to start extended organizing activities in the North. UTW President Valente has announced plans to seek NLRB elections next spring among member mills of the New Bedford Cotton Manufacturers' Association.

#### Teamsters Seek Three Million Members

A new national organizing drive to raise AFL Teamster membership to 3 million is in the making, states Dave Beck, new Teamster union president. In an interview published in the *St. Louis Labor Tribune*, Mr. Beck said the drive is aimed at bringing into the union all employees who work on jobs within the Teamsters' jurisdiction. Center of the new organizing drive will be Chicago, reports the *Tribune*, where the Teamsters' union now has forty-nine local unions with over 125,000 members.

#### Machinists Claim Union Shop Gains

Union shop provisions were included in four out of five AFL Machinist contracts signed during the third quarter of 1952, claims *The Machinist*. The UMW analysis was based on 2,349 agreements signed during the three-month period. The union's research department says 1,945 of the contracts called for the union shop, 134 prescribed maintenance of membership. In addition to union security gains, *The Machinist* states that 99.4% of these pacts call for paid vacations and 98% provide paid holidays.

#### Union Plans Village for Retired Members

The Upholsterers International Union, AFL, is moving ahead on plans for a Florida retirement village, reports the *UIU Journal*. The union's building program calls for a colony of individual homes, rather than an institution. The *UIU Journal* reports that eighteen experts in social service and retirement-home administration will counsel the union in its project.

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## PENSIONS AND OTHER BENEFITS

### Recent Legal Decisions

Restricting payment of welfare fund benefits to union members discriminates against nonunion members and therefore violates the Taft-Hartley Act, the National Labor Relations Board has ruled. The case involved Jandel Furs of Washington, D.C., and the Fur and Leather Workers' Union (ind.), whose 1949-1951 agreement provided that only union members are eligible for welfare benefits. By this agreement, according to the board, the employer engaged in illegal interference with employee rights, illegal assistance to a labor union, and illegal discrimination against individual employees. The union engaged in an illegal attempt to cause the employer to discriminate against nonunion workers. The union also violated the Taft-Hartley Act ban on interference with or coercion of employees on union matters, NLRB says.

The NLRB bases this decision on the unfair practices sections, 8 (a) and 8 (b), of the Taft-Hartley Act. It does not concern itself with Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act, which prescribes in detail the legal terms and manner of administration of an employee health and welfare fund. The legality of contract clauses covered by Section 302 is the sole responsibility of the Justice Department, the board has already said. In 1949, a decision in the United States District Court for eastern Pennsylvania found that a welfare plan restricting benefits to union members was legal under Section 302.

### Group Insurance, 1945-1951

Group insurance plans as a whole registered another advance during the year 1951, but the particular benefits offered under these insurance programs progressed at different speeds. The table on the next page, which is based on statistics prepared by the Life Insurance Association of America, indicates that life insurance growth is proceeding at about the same rate as in preceding years, including the number of policies underwritten and the number of employees insured. The average amount of life insurance in force also rose somewhat, probably reflecting increased earnings.

All kinds of hospital, surgical and medical benefits showed a big increase. The growth was most evident in all forms of dependents' coverages. The average hospital benefit for dependents increased approximately a dollar a day while the increase in the average

benefit for employees was a little over 50 cents a day. The gain in numbers of group medical contracts grew at a rapid rate for both employees and their dependents, doubling the number of contracts in force in a year's time.

### Expanded Credit Union Services

The Servel Employees' Federal Credit Union has added some new services for its members. The six-month period before a new employee could apply for a loan has been eliminated. Employees may purchase Servel products with no down payment and two years to pay, now that Regulation W has been rescinded. A new loan protection plan insures the lives of members up to age seventy for an amount equal to their loan balance at the time of death; and members up to age sixty are insured against total and permanent disability for an amount up to their loan balance. This new policy is free to employees.

### Big Prizes for Bond Buyers

The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation is giving all employees investing at least 75 cents a week in United States saving bonds the chance to win a vacation trip to Paris and other valuable prizes in a group of drawings held at the plant. All employees' clock numbers are put into the barrel, but the drawing continues until the number drawn is that of an employee who has signed up for the bond program. Along with the winning names, Lockheed makes public the numbers which were drawn but did not win because their owners had not signed up for bonds.

The grand-prize winner has the choice of a TWA trip to Paris for two, plus expense money and a paid vacation, or more than \$2,000 in bonds. Thirty other prizes—savings bonds in denominations of \$25 to \$500—are also awarded.

### Pension Funds Buy Property

R. H. Macy & Co. Inc. has sold the real estate and certain other property owned by its former radio and television operating subsidiary to the Retirement System for Employees of R. H. Macy & Co. Inc. and Affiliates. The price: \$4,500,000. The Retirement Sys-



# Group Insurance in Force in the United States and Canada, by Years, 1945 to 1951

	Number of Contracts		Number of Employees Insured			Amount of Insurance		
	Total in Force	Index: 1945=100	Total Insured	Index: 1945=100	Average Number of Employees per Policy	Total in Force (000 Dollars)	Index: 1945=100	Average Benefit per Employee (In Dollars)
<b>Group life<sup>1</sup></b>								
Employee coverage								
1945.....	30,002	100.0	11,329,388	100.0	378	22,426,725	100.0	1,979.52
1947.....	39,310	131.0	14,932,000	131.8	380	32,194,900	143.6	2,156.10
1948.....	45,610	152.0	16,105,000	142.2	353	36,970,800	164.9	2,295.61
1949.....	51,340	171.1	16,983,000	149.9	331	39,944,300	178.1	2,352.02
1950.....	55,840	186.1	19,006,000	167.8	340	47,638,400	212.4	2,506.49
1951.....	61,450	204.8	21,011,000	185.5	342	54,293,200	242.1	2,584.04
Dependents' coverage								
1945.....	150	100.0a	79,000	100.0a	527	41,400	100.0a	524.05
1947.....	250	166.7a	119,000	150.6a	476	58,200	140.6a	489.08
1948.....	370	246.7a	249,000	315.2a	673	123,500	298.3a	495.98
1949.....	460	300.0a	367,000	464.6a	816	178,000	430.0a	485.01
Group accident and sickness								
1945.....	23,059	100.0	5,921,360	100.0	257	100,830b	100.0	17.08
1947.....	35,580	154.3	8,377,000	141.5	235	162,100b	160.8	19.35
1948.....	43,540	188.8	9,498,000	160.4	218	194,400b	192.8	20.47
1949.....	66,400	288.0	10,260,000	173.3	155	228,400b	226.5	22.26
1950.....	175,780	762.3	15,104,000	255.1	86	365,100b	362.1	24.17
1951.....	203,100	880.8	17,992,000	303.8	89	423,800b	420.3	23.55
Group hospital expense								
Employee coverage								
1945.....	20,389	100.0	4,371,350	100.0	214	19,939c	100.0	4.56c
1947.....	27,750	136.1	7,110,000	162.6	256	36,300c	182.1	5.11c
1948.....	33,860	166.1	7,902,000	180.8	233	43,300c	217.2	5.48c
1949.....	44,760	219.5	8,500,000	194.4	190	50,400c	252.8	5.93c
1950.....	51,800	254.1	10,057,000	230.1	194	68,000c	341.0	6.76c
1951.....	64,390	315.8	12,132,000	277.5	188	88,900c	445.9	7.33c
Dependents' coverage								
1945.....	10,849	100.0	3,432,320	100.0	316	13,914c	100.0	4.05c
1947.....	16,050	147.9	7,080,000	206.3	441	32,900c	236.5	6.65c
1948.....	22,340	205.9	8,839,000	257.5	396	44,900c	322.7	5.08c
1949.....	31,850	293.6	9,197,000	268.0	239	52,600c	378.0	5.72c
1950.....	40,900	377.0	12,248,000	356.8	299	74,300c	534.0	6.07c
1951.....	52,220	481.3	14,531,000	423.4	278	102,000c	733.1	7.02c
Group surgical expense								
Employee coverage								
1945.....	18,936	100.0	3,948,565	100.0	209	579,081d	100.0	146.66d
1947.....	25,610	135.2	6,529,000	165.4	255	959,292d	165.7	146.93d
1948.....	33,870	178.9	7,729,000	195.7	228	1,155,000d	199.5	149.44d
1949.....	44,220	233.5	8,396,000	212.6	190	1,316,700d	227.4	156.82d
1950.....	53,560	282.8	10,309,000	261.1	192	1,809,300d	312.4	175.51d
1951.....	65,540	346.1	12,586,000	318.7	192	2,327,600d	401.9	184.94d
Dependents' coverage								
1945.....	7,350	100.0	1,587,669	100.0	216	207,363d	100.0	130.61d
1947.....	11,510	156.6	4,574,000	288.1	397	568,200d	274.0	124.22d
1948.....	18,750	255.1	6,470,000	407.5	345	872,800d	420.9	134.90d
1949.....	29,000	394.6	7,194,000	453.1	243	1,061,700d	512.0	147.58d
1950.....	39,740	540.7	10,910,000	687.2	275	1,688,000d	814.0	154.72d
1951.....	49,730	676.6	13,790,000	868.6	277	2,340,100d	1,128.5	169.70d
Group medical expense								
Employee coverage								
1945.....	2,014	100.0	335,152	100.0	166	e	.....	e
1947.....	4,180	207.5	852,000	254.2	204	e	.....	e
1948.....	5,980	296.9	1,295,000	386.4	217	e	.....	e
1949.....	8,360	415.1	1,712,000	510.8	205	e	.....	e
1950.....	14,570f	723.4f	3,465,000	1,033.9f	233f	e	.....	e
1951.....	22,700	1,127.1	4,530,000	1,351.6	200	e	.....	e
Dependents' coverage								
1945.....	508	100.0	97,876	100.0	193	e	.....	e
1947.....	580	114.2	246,000	251.3	424	e	.....	e
1948.....	1,310	257.9	632,000	645.7	482	e	.....	e
1949.....	3,360	661.4	1,024,000	1,046.2	305	e	.....	e
1950.....	6,580	1,295.3	2,179,000	2,226.3	331	e	.....	e
1951.....	12,200	2,401.6	3,416,000	3,490.1	280	e	.....	e
Group accidental death and dismemberment								
1945.....	21,006	100.0	3,709,071	100.0	177	6,407,853g	100.0	1,727.62g
1947.....	24,330	115.8	4,979,000	134.2	205	9,601,000g	149.8	1,928.30g
1948.....	28,600	136.2	6,147,000	165.7	215	11,396,900g	177.9	1,854.06g
1949.....	32,840	156.3	6,669,000	179.8	203	12,975,800g	202.5	1,945.89g
1950.....	38,430	182.9	8,073,000	217.7	210	16,217,100g	253.1	2,008.81g
1951.....	48,920	232.9	9,470,000	255.3	194	19,539,400g	304.9	2,063.29g

Source: Compiled from annual reports of the Life Insurance Association of America

a1948=100.0 bWeekly benefit cDaily benefit dMaximum surgical benefit eNot available fRevised gPrincipal sum 1Not including group indebtedness or wholesale life

tem, which is in its ninth year, covers 10,982 employees. The system's net assets are now \$19,812,000.

\* \* \*

Another pension fund, that of E. G. Skinner & Co., Inc., has just bought out the company which established it. The company owns thirty-three retail meat markets in the Middle West and has 250 employees, about 150 of whom are members of the pension plan. The fund is paying about \$400,000 for the business.

## New Labor Studies

A long-range study of the problems of old age and retirement is being undertaken by Cornell University under a grant from the Lilly Foundation of Indianapolis. About 5,000 older employees of companies in various parts of the United States have just filled out the first of the seven annual questionnaires on which the report will be based.

\* \* \*

More than a fifth of the 59 million workers employed at the time of a recent Bureau of Labor Statistics survey had been on the same job for nine years or more. The study breaks down the nation's labor force of January, 1951, into four job-tenure categories:

- The group who have been on the same job since before Pearl Harbor; 13 million, or 22% of the total.
- Those still holding jobs obtained during World War II; 7 million, or 12%.
- Those who got their present jobs between V-J day and the outbreak of the Korean conflict in June, 1950; 26.5 million, or 45%.
- The group whose jobs date from Korea; over 11 million, or about 20%.

Of the 13 million with nine or more years of job tenure, about 4.5 million were under age forty-five. Of the other 8.5 million, nearly half were between forty-five and fifty-four; over a third were in the fifty-five to sixty-four bracket; and a sixth were over age sixty-five.

The findings of the BLS survey are published in the *Monthly Labor Review* for September, 1952.

## Keeping Employees Informed

In celebration of the golden anniversary of the General Electric Company's health insurance plan, the company has distributed a special four-page folder to its employees. The folder illustrates the evolution of the insurance program at GE from the founding of a mutual benefit association in 1902 to the present

group insurance plan, which includes life and accidental death and dismemberment insurance, hospital and surgical benefits, medical care and maternity allowance, and weekly disability benefits. About 98% of all active employees are now enrolled in the GE insurance plan.

1952 also marks the fortieth anniversary of the General Electric Company's pension plan.

\* \* \*

The November, 1952, issue of the Hammermill Paper Company's employee magazine is devoted almost entirely to the company's retirement program. The cover of the special pension issue depicts a relaxed and happy retiree, and nine pages of illustrated text give a detailed explanation of every phase of the pension plan.

## What If the Union Bargaining Agent Changes?

A clause providing for retention of a previously bargained insurance program in the event of a change in bargaining agents is included in the agreement between the International Association of Machinists, AFL, and the Shelbyville, Illinois plant of the Oliver Corporation. The contract states as the reason for this provision the fact that "insurance plans and agreements for the establishment of same are by their nature matters requiring the parties to enter into commitments for considerable periods of time."

## New and Increased Benefits

The Carrier Corporation has established a major-medical-expense plan supplementing its basic group insurance program. The plan has a deductible amount of \$300 (including benefits under the basic plan). It pays 80% of most major medical expenses above the deductible amount, to a maximum of \$10,000. (On charges of more than \$500 incurred for surgical fees or for a registered nurse's care outside the hospital, the plan pays 70% of the excess, up to \$10,000.) Mental infirmity is included as an illness covered by the plan. Employees earning over \$6,000 a year are eligible. The weekly cost is 38 cents for individual coverage and \$1.09 for family coverage.

Carrier's basic plan, covering all employees, has a new benefit schedule as of July 1, 1952. The plan now pays a daily hospital benefit of \$11 for seventy days, \$100 for miscellaneous hospital expenses, \$3 per day in-hospital medical expense, and a \$225 surgical maximum. The weekly disability benefit ranges from \$20 for employees earning under \$2,000 per year, to \$50 for those earning \$6,000 and over. \$3,000 is the minimum for life insurance, \$20,000 the maximum. The weekly contribution for family coverage under the basic plan ranges from \$1.03 to \$3.04, depending on



earnings. Single employees contribute from 49 cents to \$5 per week.

\* \* \*

"Bigger and Better" is the title of a new booklet describing the Kaiser-Frazer UAW-CIO group insurance program. The new benefits, which became effective February 1, 1951, give \$5 per day up to seventy days for in-hospital care by a physician (employee and dependents); X-Ray and electrocardiograph expenses (employee and dependents); Blue Shield surgical benefits; and \$1,000 death benefits for retired employees. Benefits which continue as before are \$30 per week disability payment for twenty-six weeks; actual cost of hospitalization for employee and dependents up to 120 days, and \$2,000 death benefits if the employee dies before retirement.

The Kaiser-Frazer UAW-CIO plan is financed entirely by the company and is administered jointly by labor and management.

A companion piece to the group insurance booklet is an illustrated booklet explaining the company-financed, jointly-administered pension plan.

The Standard Oil Company of Indiana announces ten changes in its pension program, effective July 1, 1952, several of which follow:

- Employee contributions have been reduced.
- The normal retirement age for women has been raised from age sixty to age sixty-five—the same as for men.
- An employee may now retire at age fifty-five.
- A minimum monthly retirement income is now guaranteed; this ranges from \$110 a month, including Social Security, for an employee with ten years of service to \$200 a month for the employee who retires after forty years of service.
- As a possible offset to the low earnings of the depression years, past service credits may now be based on average monthly earnings in 1936, 1937, or 1938, whichever is highest, if this will result in a higher pension for the worker; otherwise the old formula will be followed.

LOIS E. FORDE

*Division of Personnel Administration*

## Multi-Unit Bargaining

*(Continued from page 460)*

would be impractical. Any legislation would have to be so drawn as to prevent the destruction of units which have existed successfully, historically. Otherwise, the disruption caused might be more serious than the effects of the group bargaining, and the legislation probably could not be passed in any event. Rather, it seems desirable and necessary to pass legislation which would impede or prevent the growth of unreasonable group-bargaining units. Perhaps an effective approach would be to require a policy of the National Labor Relations Board in new certifications to confine the bargaining unit to a single plant of a single company unless compelling economic reasons exist for a larger unit."

### Against Legislation Breaking Up Units

"The less government intervention into labor-management relations, the better." That sums up the feelings of those who oppose legislative restrictions on multi-unit bargaining. The reasons given by these industrial relations executives for opposing such legislation at this time are:

- To prohibit multiple-employer bargaining and at the same time permit multiple-employer unions would have the result of "further unbalancing the relative bargaining power, and greatly strengthening the power of the union."

• Restraints to force bargaining back to a local level would be impractical for there would be "devious ways of circumventing such legislation, and much of industry would not be sympathetic to it."

• "Large unions can obtain the results of broad-base bargaining whether the negotiations are carried on individually, company-wide, or industry-wide, because of the apparent willingness of many managements to adopt a philosophy of pattern bargaining."

• "A large number of companies are unwilling to hazard the possibility of strike by refusing to grant some concessions which have already been granted by other companies within their own industry, or even by other noncompeting companies within their local employment area."

• "Any legislation that would have the effect of invalidating established collective bargaining practices which have proven effective would cause more harm than good."

• "While legislation might be of immediate benefit to some industrial managements and to some employers, it would inevitably be followed by subsequent laws placing additional restrictions on the actions of employers—with more bureaus and agencies, more bureaucratic regulations and rules, and more governmental control over the lives of all."

JAMES J. BAMBRICK, JR.

HERMINE ZAGAT

*Division of Personnel Administration*

# Significant Labor Statistics

Item	Unit	1952							Year Ago	Percentage Change	
		Oct.	Sept.	Aug.	July	June	May	Apr.		Latest Month over Previous Month	Latest Month over Year Ago
Consumers' Price Index <sup>1</sup>											
All items.....	Jan. 1939=100	181.6	r 181.7	r 182.6	r 182.1	180.8	180.6	179.9	177.6	-0.1	+2.3
Food.....	Jan. 1939=100	240.0	241.1	k 243.9	243.2	j 240.5	240.1	237.8	235.0	-0.5	+2.1
Housing.....	Jan. 1939=100	126.2	r 125.6	r 125.6	r 125.2	124.9	124.9	124.7	122.7	+0.5	+2.9
Clothing.....	Jan. 1939=100	150.5	r 150.8	150.5	150.7	151.0	151.7	152.1	156.3	-0.2	-3.7
Men's.....	Jan. 1939=100	167.4	r 167.4	r 167.8	168.2	168.3	169.0	169.6	175.0	0	-4.3
Women's.....	Jan. 1939=100	136.1	136.6	135.7	135.9	136.2	137.1	137.3	140.6	-0.4	-3.2
Fuels.....	Jan. 1939=100	137.9	r 136.3	135.8	r 134.8	133.9	133.4	135.9	135.1	+1.2	+2.1
Electricity.....	Jan. 1939=100	92.7	93.0	r 93.2	r 91.3	91.4	91.4	91.3	90.9	-0.3	+2.0
Gas.....	Jan. 1939=100	102.9	102.9	102.8	102.8	102.9	102.9	103.1	101.7	0	+1.2
Housefurnishings.....	Jan. 1939=100	164.4	165.2	165.1	r 164.8	165.6	166.1	167.5	169.8	-0.5	-3.2
Sundries.....	Jan. 1939=100	173.2	172.9	173.0	172.5	171.1	170.7	170.4	164.9	+0.2	+5.0
Purchasing value of the dollar.....	Jan. 1939 dollars	55.1	55.0	r 54.8	54.9	55.3	55.4	55.6	56.3	+0.2	-2.1
All items (BLS).....	1935-1939=100	a 191.5	a 194.1	a 192.3	a 192.4	a 191.1	a 190.4	a 189.6	a 187.8	+0.1	+2.0
Employment Status <sup>2</sup>											
Civilian labor force.....	thousands	63,146	63,698	63,958	64,176	64,390	62,778	61,744	63,452	-0.9	-0.5
Employed.....	thousands	61,862	62,260	62,354	62,234	62,572	61,176	60,132	61,836	-0.6	f
Agriculture.....	thousands	7,274	7,548	6,964	7,598	8,170	6,960	6,412	7,668	-3.6	-5.1
Nonagricultural industries.....	thousands	54,588	54,712	55,390	54,636	54,402	54,216	53,720	54,168	-0.2	+0.8
Unemployed.....	thousands	1,284	1,438	1,604	1,942	1,818	1,602	1,612	1,616	-10.7	-20.5
Wage Earners <sup>3</sup>											
Employees in nonagricultural establishments.....	thousands	p 47,705	r 47,693	r 47,106	r 46,006	46,292	46,355	46,299	46,902	f	+1.7
Manufacturing.....	thousands	p 16,406	r 16,361	r 16,015	r 15,162	15,410	15,680	15,795	15,965	+0.3	+2.8
Mining.....	thousands	p 858	r 874	887	784	814	893	896	917	-1.8	-6.4
Construction.....	thousands	p 2,686	r 2,763	r 2,783	r 2,722	2,663	2,520	2,416	2,761	-2.8	-2.7
Transportation and public utilities.....	thousands	p 4,220	r 4,217	r 4,201	r 4,140	4,168	4,134	4,096	4,166	+0.1	+1.3
Trade.....	thousands	p 10,084	r 9,970	r 9,795	r 9,792	9,838	9,773	9,845	9,893	+1.1	+1.9
Finance.....	thousands	p 1,971	1,972	r 1,993	r 1,993	1,977	1,958	1,952	1,898	-0.1	+3.8
Service.....	thousands	p 4,766	r 4,824	r 4,843	r 4,855	4,837	4,795	4,748	4,770	-1.2	-0.1
Government.....	thousands	p 6,714	6,712	6,589	6,558	6,585	6,602	6,551	6,532	f	+2.8
Production and related workers in manuf'g											
Employment.....											
All manufacturing.....	thousands	p 13,254	r 13,218	r 12,874	r 12,061	12,329	12,606	12,733	12,997	+0.3	+2.0
Durable.....	thousands	p 7,487	r 7,389	r 7,134	r 6,559	6,888	7,280	7,329	7,296	+1.3	+2.6
Nondurable.....	thousands	p 5,767	r 5,829	r 5,740	r 5,502	5,441	5,326	5,404	5,701	-1.1	+1.2
Average weekly hours.....											
All manufacturing.....	number	p 41.5	r 41.3	40.6	39.9	40.5	40.2	39.8	40.5	+0.5	+2.5
Durable.....	number	p 42.4	r 42.0	r 41.1	r 40.2	41.2	41.1	40.8	41.7	+1.0	+1.7
Nondurable.....	number	p 40.3	40.3	39.9	39.5	39.5	39.0	38.4	38.9	0	+3.6
Average hourly earnings.....											
All manufacturing.....	dollars	p 1.706	r 1.697	1.670	1.648	1.658	1.658	1.655	1.615	+0.5	+5.6
Durable.....	dollars	p 1.823	r 1.811	r 1.769	r 1.733	1.747	1.746	1.742	1.705	+0.7	+6.9
Nondurable.....	dollars	p 1.546	1.546	1.543	1.545	1.540	1.530	1.529	1.491	0	+3.7
Average weekly earnings.....											
All manufacturing.....	dollars	p 70.80	r 70.09	67.80	65.76	67.15	66.65	65.87	65.41	+1.0	+8.2
Durable.....	dollars	p 77.30	r 76.06	r 72.71	69.67	71.93	71.76	71.07	71.10	+1.6	+8.7
Nondurable.....	dollars	p 62.30	62.30	61.57	61.03	60.83	59.71	58.71	58.00	0	+7.4
Straight time hourly earnings.....											
All manufacturing.....	dollars	e 1.639	r 1.633	1.617	1.605	1.607	1.610	1.605	1.557	+0.4	+5.3
Durable.....	dollars	e 1.737	r 1.733	1.705	r 1.683	1.682	1.682	1.683	1.635	+0.2	+6.2
Nondurable.....	dollars	e 1.500	1.500	1.503	1.509	1.505	1.499	1.494	1.450	0	+3.4
Turnover rates in manufacturing <sup>4</sup>											
Separations.....	per 100 employees	p 4.2	4.9	4.6	5.0	3.9	3.9	4.1	4.7	-14.3	-10.6
Quits.....	per 100 employees	p 2.8	3.5	3.0	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.5	-20.0	+12.0
Discharges.....	per 100 employees	p 0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0	0
Layoffs.....	per 100 employees	p 0.7	0.7	1.0	2.2	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.4	0	-50.0
Accessions.....	per 100 employees	p 5.3	r 5.6	5.9	4.4	4.9	3.9	3.7	4.4	-5.4	+20.5

<sup>1</sup> THE CONFERENCE BOARD  
<sup>2</sup> Bureau of the Census  
<sup>3</sup> Bureau of Labor Statistics

a Adjusted indexes:  
Apr., 188.7; May, 189.0; June, 189.6; July, 190.8;  
Aug., 191.1; Sept., 190.3; Oct., 190.9.  
Year ago, 187.4.

f Less than .05  
i Based on food prices for May 14, 1952  
j Based on food prices for June 16, 1952  
k Based on food prices for August 13, 1952.

e Estimated  
p Preliminary  
r Revised



# Review of Labor Statistics

**C**ONSUMERS' PRICES moved down for the second consecutive month according to THE CONFERENCE BOARD's latest survey. Lower prices of food, clothing and housefurnishings pushed the index down 0.1% during the month ending October 15, bringing it to 181.6 (January, 1939=100). This is still 2.3% higher than the October, 1951, level.

Food prices declined 0.5% over the month. Heavy cattle slaughter toppled beef prices throughout the country, and prices of lamb and pork were caught in the slide. Butter, sweet and white potatoes, cabbage, spinach, lettuce and bananas also registered declines while higher prices were reported for margarine, green beans, onions and oranges. Food prices have reached their lowest level since April of this year and many authorities feel that further declines are in prospect. Cattle slaughter is expected to show a gain of approximately 25% in 1953; some experts think this will mean

a minimum decline of 20% in retail beef prices during the next few months.

After registering slight upward movements for two months, housefurnishings slumped once again in October. An 0.5% decrease put this index at its lowest level since November, 1950. This component has dropped 3.2% over the past year. Clothing prices also dipped (0.2%) during the month, but in spite of these declines, retailers and manufacturers generally looked forward to better clothing and furniture markets in 1953.

Housing costs advanced 0.5% between mid-September and mid-October, reflecting the lifting of rent controls in a number of cities on September 30. The index still has not felt the full impact of rent increases, since a number of cities have not been surveyed since the decontrol date.


Fuel prices advanced 1.2% over the month and sundries increased 0.2% in spite of the lower prices reported for soaps and soap powders, tires and tubes.

Purchasing value of the consumers' dollar rose 0.2% to reach a level of 55.1 cents (January, 1939, dollar=100 cents). This was its highest purchasing value since last June.

## EMPLOYMENT

Total civilian employment in October was approximately 400,000 below the estimate for September, but

## Proportion of Average Sales Paid Management in Selected Manufacturing Industries



Sources: Securities and Exchange Commission; The Conference Board

# Consumers' Price Indexes for Cities Surveyed Quarterly

NOTE: These indexes do NOT show intercity differences in price level or standards of living. They show only changes in consumers' prices in each city, which changes may be compared with those for other cities.

	Index Numbers Jan., 1939 = 100			Percentage Changes			Index Numbers Jan., 1939 = 100			Percentage Changes	
	Oct. 1952	July 1952	Oct. 1951	July 1952 to Oct. 1952	Oct. 1951 to Oct. 1952		Oct. 1952	July 1952	Oct. 1951	July 1952 to Oct. 1952	Oct. 1951 to Oct. 1952
<b>Baltimore</b>						<b>Minneapolis-St. Paul</b>					
Food.....	239.2	242.9 <sub>r</sub>	234.7	-1.5	+1.9	Food.....	257.0	254.3 <sub>r</sub>	250.9	+1.1	+2.4
Housing.....	116.8	116.8	115.7	0	+1.0	Housing.....	113.0	113.0 <sub>r</sub>	109.8	0	+2.3
Clothing.....	153.5	154.9	156.8	-0.9	-2.1	Clothing.....	154.2	153.7 <sub>r</sub>	159.5	+0.3	-3.3
Fuel <sup>1</sup> .....	157.4	154.5 <sub>r</sub>	155.6	+1.9	+1.2	Fuel <sup>1</sup> .....	143.7	142.0	140.2	+1.2	+2.5
Housefurnishings.....	193.0	192.2	200.9	+0.4	-3.9	Housefurnishings.....	177.8	177.8	182.5	0	-2.6
Sundries.....	172.5	172.3	160.3	+0.1	+7.6	Sundries.....	177.2	177.4 <sub>r</sub>	168.9	-0.1	+4.9
Weighted total.....	183.5	184.7 <sub>r</sub>	179.3	-0.6	+2.3	Weighted total.....	184.6	183.7 <sub>r</sub>	180.3 <sub>r</sub>	+0.5	+2.4
<b>Bridgeport</b>						<b>Newark</b>					
Food.....	232.5	237.3	227.3	-2.0	+2.3	Food.....	237.4	241.9 <sub>r</sub>	227.3	-1.9	+4.4
Housing.....	119.5	118.5 <sub>r</sub>	114.8	+0.8	+4.1	Housing.....	111.1	111.1	108.5	0	+2.4
Clothing.....	144.8	145.6	147.8	-0.5	-2.0	Clothing.....	143.7	140.6	148.0	+2.2	-2.9
Fuel <sup>1</sup> .....	167.2	164.9	159.8	+1.4	+4.6	Fuel <sup>1</sup> .....	124.2	121.5	123.3	+2.2	+0.7
Housefurnishings.....	162.6	162.1	163.8	+0.3	-0.7	Housefurnishings.....	194.1	190.2 <sub>r</sub>	205.6	+2.1	-5.6
Sundries.....	182.0	181.9 <sub>r</sub>	179.2	+0.1	+1.6	Sundries.....	166.8	167.3	147.3	-0.3	+13.2
Weighted total.....	180.9	182.1 <sub>r</sub>	177.2	-0.7	+2.1	Weighted total.....	178.8	180.0 <sub>r</sub>	169.9	-0.7	+5.2
<b>Erie</b>						<b>Roanoke</b>					
Food.....	261.1	263.4 <sub>r</sub>	258.5	-0.9	+1.0	Food.....	241.7	244.9 <sub>r</sub>	237.0	-1.3	+2.0
Housing.....	137.3	135.9 <sub>r</sub>	134.1	+1.0	+2.4	Housing.....	157.8	157.0 <sub>r</sub>	157.9	+0.5	-0.1
Clothing.....	175.9	177.6	180.0	-1.0	-2.3	Clothing.....	168.3	168.5 <sub>r</sub>	176.0	-0.1	-4.4
Fuel <sup>1</sup> .....	176.4	170.3	169.0	+3.6	+4.4	Fuel <sup>1</sup> .....	151.2	142.6	146.2	+6.0	+3.4
Housefurnishings.....	169.3	169.6	172.7	-0.2	-2.0	Housefurnishings.....	173.8	172.7 <sub>r</sub>	176.9	+0.6	-1.8
Sundries.....	175.3	175.0 <sub>r</sub>	163.2	+0.2	+7.4	Sundries.....	163.2	163.3 <sub>r</sub>	158.4 <sub>r</sub>	-0.1	+3.0
Weighted total.....	195.7	195.7 <sub>r</sub>	190.8	0	+2.6	Weighted total.....	185.6	185.8 <sub>r</sub>	183.3 <sub>r</sub>	-0.1	+1.3
<b>Grand Rapids</b>						<b>Seattle</b>					
Food.....	242.4	246.2 <sub>r</sub>	236.5	-1.5	+2.5	Food.....	237.0	237.2 <sub>r</sub>	229.6	-0.1	+3.2
Housing.....	181.7	176.6	173.8	+2.9	+4.5	Housing.....	136.9	135.2	135.5	+1.3	+1.0
Clothing.....	142.6	140.4	148.4	+1.6	-3.9	Clothing.....	143.7	143.7 <sub>r</sub>	147.4	0	-2.5
Fuel <sup>1</sup> .....	161.6	153.5	154.8	+5.3	+4.4	Fuel <sup>1</sup> .....	139.8	139.2 <sub>r</sub>	140.7	+0.4	-0.6
Housefurnishings.....	173.9	175.5	185.1 <sub>r</sub>	-0.9	-6.1	Housefurnishings.....	182.1	179.2	178.7	+1.6	+1.9
Sundries.....	176.7	176.0 <sub>r</sub>	171.3	+0.4	+3.2	Sundries.....	160.6	160.6	158.7	0	+1.2
Weighted total.....	191.7	191.0 <sub>r</sub>	187.7 <sub>r</sub>	+0.4	+2.1	Weighted total.....	178.9	178.5 <sub>r</sub>	176.0	+0.2	+1.6
<b>Houston</b>						<b>Syracuse</b>					
Food.....	236.8	238.3 <sub>r</sub>	236.7	-0.6	a	Food.....	243.8	249.9	238.6	-2.4	+2.2
Housing.....	144.2	142.5 <sub>r</sub>	137.9	+1.2	+4.6	Housing.....	125.8	124.8	124.8	+0.8	+0.8
Clothing.....	150.2	151.9 <sub>r</sub>	166.4	-1.1	-4.0	Clothing.....	161.1	157.6	165.3	+2.2	-2.5
Fuel <sup>1</sup> .....	81.8	81.8	81.8	0	0	Fuel <sup>1</sup> .....	169.1	163.7	164.1	+3.3	+3.0
Housefurnishings.....	142.9	144.1	147.7	-0.8	-3.2	Housefurnishings.....	175.8	176.1	177.5	-0.2	-1.0
Sundries.....	167.5	167.7 <sub>r</sub>	162.0	-0.1	+3.4	Sundries.....	154.4	153.0	150.7 <sub>r</sub>	+0.9	+2.5
Weighted total.....	174.8	175.3 <sub>r</sub>	172.9	-0.3	+1.1	Weighted total.....	177.4	177.8 <sub>r</sub>	174.8 <sub>r</sub>	-0.2	+1.5

Source: THE CONFERENCE BOARD.

<sup>1</sup> Includes electricity and gas.

<sub>r</sub> Revised.

a Less than 0.1%

## Consumers' Price Index for Ten United States Cities, and Purchasing Value of Dollar

Index Numbers, January, 1939 = 100

Date	Weighted Average of All Items	Food	Housing <sup>1</sup>	Clothing			Fuel <sup>2</sup>			House- furnish- ings	Sundries	Purchasing Value of the Dollar
				Total	Men's	Women's	Total	Electricity	Gas			
1951 October.....	176.0	232.1	118.8	153.6	170.8	139.2	132.5	89.8	103.7	169.2	166.3	56.8
November.....	178.2	236.8 <sub>a</sub>	119.9	152.7	169.3	138.7	132.7	89.8	103.7	169.7	167.9	56.1
December.....	178.8	236.7 <sub>b</sub>	120.3	152.1	168.9	138.0	133.0	89.8	103.7	169.9	170.3	55.9
Annual average.....	174.5	229.3	116.9	152.2	168.3	138.7	131.7	89.8	103.7	170.8	166.3	57.3
1952 January.....	179.0	237.5	120.9	151.2	167.3	137.5	133.1	90.0	103.7	168.6	170.1	55.9
February.....	176.3	230.7 <sub>c</sub>	121.1	150.1	166.3	136.5	133.0	90.0	103.7	168.3	169.0	56.7
March.....	176.7	231.0 <sub>d</sub>	121.2	149.8	166.0	136.1	133.2	90.0	104.3	167.0	170.1	56.6
April.....	178.4	234.3	121.4	149.7	165.8	136.1	133.3	90.0	104.9	166.9	172.1	56.1
May.....	178.9	236.6 <sub>e</sub>	121.5	149.4	165.2	136.1	130.6	90.0	104.8	165.5	172.2	55.9
June.....	179.0	237.0 <sub>f</sub>	121.5	148.8	164.7	135.4	130.9	90.0	104.8	165.0	172.3	55.9
July.....	180.4	239.8	121.7	148.5	164.6	135.0	131.7	90.0	104.8	164.3	173.6	55.4
August.....	180.9 <sub>r</sub>	240.6 <sub>g</sub>	122.1	148.2	164.3	134.7	132.9	92.2	104.8	164.5	174.0	55.3
September.....	180.0	237.7 <sub>r</sub>	122.2	148.4 <sub>r</sub>	163.7 <sub>r</sub>	135.5	133.7	92.2	104.8	164.5	174.0	55.6
October.....	179.8	236.5	122.7	148.0	163.7	134.8	135.4	92.2	104.8	163.6	174.4	55.6

### Percentage Changes

Sept. 1952 to Oct. 1952.....	-0.1	-0.5	+0.4	-0.3	0	-0.5	+1.3	0	0	-0.5	+0.2	0
Oct. 1951 to Oct. 1952.....	+2.2	+1.9	+3.3	-3.6	-4.2	-3.2	+2.2	+2.7	+1.1	-3.3	+4.9	-2.1

<sup>1</sup> Rents surveyed quarterly in individual cities

<sup>2</sup> Includes electricity and gas

<sup>a</sup> Based on food prices for Nov. 14, 1951

<sup>b</sup> Based on food prices for Dec. 12, 1951

<sup>c</sup> Based on food prices for Feb. 13, 1952

<sup>d</sup> Based on food prices for March 12, 1952

<sup>e</sup> Based on food prices for May 14, 1952

<sup>f</sup> Based on food prices for June 16, 1952

<sup>g</sup> Based on food prices for August 13, 1952.

<sub>r</sub> Revised



# Consumers' Price Indexes for Cities Surveyed Monthly

City	Index Numbers Jan., 1939=100			Percentage Changes		City	Index Numbers Jan., 1939=100			Percentage Changes	
	Oct. 1952	Sept. 1952	Oct. 1951	Sept. 1952 to Oct. 1952	Oct. 1951 to Oct. 1952		Oct. 1952	Sept. 1952	Oct. 1951	Sept. 1952 to Oct. 1952	Oct. 1951 to Oct. 1952
<b>Birmingham</b>						<b>Indianapolis</b>					
Food.....	235.7	237.6	235.8	-0.8	a	Food.....	252.5	253.5r	245.8	-0.4	+2.7
Housing <sup>1</sup> .....	160.9	160.9	152.4r	0	+5.6	Housing <sup>1</sup> .....	124.4	124.4	122.5r	0	+1.6
Clothing.....	151.4	151.4	155.0	0	-2.3	Clothing.....	144.5	145.1	150.7	-0.4	-4.1
Fuel <sup>4</sup> .....	134.6	132.5	131.5	+1.6	+2.4	Fuel <sup>4</sup> .....	159.9	159.2	157.8	+0.4	+1.3
Housefurnishings.....	170.9	170.9	172.5	0	-0.9	Housefurnishings.....	160.0	159.9	162.0	+0.1	-1.2
Sundries.....	154.2	154.6	151.3r	-0.3	+1.9	Sundries.....	179.9	180.0	172.5r	-0.1	+4.3
Weighted total.....	178.4	178.9	176.4r	-0.3	+1.1	Weighted total....	185.2	185.5r	181.4r	-0.2	+2.1
<b>Boston</b>						<b>Los Angeles</b>					
Food.....	230.5	230.3	222.9	+0.1	+3.4	Food.....	235.5	236.4r	235.1	-0.4	+0.2
Housing <sup>1</sup> .....	129.5	129.5	117.9	0	+9.8	Housing <sup>1</sup> .....	143.0	143.0	141.1	0	+1.3
Clothing.....	142.4	142.1	146.5	+0.2	-2.8	Clothing.....	141.7	142.1	145.3	-0.3	-2.5
Fuel <sup>4</sup> .....	175.4	173.8	167.6	+0.9	+4.7	Fuel <sup>4</sup> .....	101.1	101.1	97.7	0	+3.5
Housefurnishings.....	156.1	155.9	165.0	+0.1	-5.4	Housefurnishings.....	159.6	159.3	168.5	+0.2	-5.3
Sundries.....	165.7	165.9	163.6	-0.1	+1.3	Sundries.....	170.0	170.3	162.3	-0.2	+4.7
Weighted total.....	179.9	179.7	174.4	+0.1	+3.2	Weighted total....	178.2	178.6	175.9	-0.2	+1.3
<b>Chicago</b>						<b>New Orleans</b>					
Food.....	253.9	254.1r	248.2	-0.1	+2.3	Food.....	251.3	253.1	240.0	-0.7	+4.7
Housing <sup>1</sup> .....	136.7	133.6	129.9	+2.3	+5.2	Housing <sup>1</sup> .....	133.0	133.0	130.8r	0	+1.7
Clothing.....	146.3	146.4r	152.8	-0.1	-4.3	Clothing.....	156.3	156.3	160.2	0	-2.4
Fuel <sup>4</sup> .....	119.0	118.0	117.3	+0.8	+1.4	Fuel <sup>4</sup> .....	93.2	93.2r	91.2	0	+2.2
Housefurnishings.....	158.7	158.7	161.7	0	-1.9	Housefurnishings.....	172.0	179.3	176.5	-4.1	-2.5
Sundries.....	176.3	176.3	173.0r	0	+1.9	Sundries.....	147.7	147.8r	145.7	-0.1	+1.4
Weighted total.....	186.4	185.8	182.8r	-0.3	+2.0	Weighted total....	183.4	184.4	178.8r	-0.5	+2.6
<b>Denver</b>						<b>New York</b>					
Food.....	239.5	237.3	232.3	+0.9	+3.1	Food.....	226.1	228.0	223.2	-0.8	+1.3
Housing <sup>1</sup> .....	128.5	128.5	128.2	0	+0.2	Housing <sup>1</sup> .....	107.1	107.1	105.6	0	+1.4
Clothing.....	162.5	162.7	172.4	-0.1	-5.7	Clothing.....	151.6	152.4	156.7r	-0.5	-3.3
Fuel <sup>4</sup> .....	105.1	103.6	108.2	+1.4	-2.9	Fuel <sup>4</sup> .....	136.9	135.2	133.3	+1.3	+2.7
Housefurnishings.....	158.9	160.6	166.7	-1.1	-4.7	Housefurnishings.....	162.1	164.3	168.7	-1.3	-3.9
Sundries.....	159.7	154.7	157.1r	+3.2	+1.7	Sundries.....	175.7	175.7	166.0	0	+5.8
Weighted total.....	175.6	173.4	174.1r	+1.3	+0.9	Weighted total....	174.3	175.1	171.2r	-0.5	+1.8
<b>Detroit</b>						<b>Philadelphia</b>					
Food.....	248.4	250.3	240.9r	-0.8	+3.1	Food.....	227.8	229.2	222.9	-0.6	+2.2
Housing <sup>1</sup> .....	130.6	130.6	121.8	0	+7.2	Housing <sup>1</sup> .....	117.6	117.6	114.3r	0	+2.9
Clothing.....	146.6	146.6	156.3	0	-6.2	Clothing.....	142.7	142.7	147.1	0	-3.0
Fuel <sup>4</sup> .....	161.6	160.4	159.3	+0.7	+1.1	Fuel <sup>4</sup> .....	160.4	154.6	157.6	+3.8	+1.8
Housefurnishings.....	168.8	167.7	170.3	+0.7	-0.9	Housefurnishings.....	176.9	176.7	184.3	+0.1	-4.0
Sundries.....	183.8	179.1	175.1	+2.6	+5.0	Sundries.....	176.3	177.1r	160.7r	-0.5	+9.7
Weighted total.....	186.2	185.3	180.7	+0.5	+3.0	Weighted total....	180.5	180.8r	174.9r	-0.2	+3.2

Source: THE CONFERENCE BOARD.

<sup>1</sup> Rents surveyed January, April, July, October.

<sup>2</sup> Rents surveyed February, May, August, November.

<sup>3</sup> Rents surveyed March, June, September, December.

<sup>4</sup> Includes electricity and gas.

a Less than 0.1%

r Revised.

## Consumers' Price Index for Thirty-nine Cities, and Purchasing Value of the Dollar

Index Numbers, January, 1939=100

Date	Weighted Average of All Items	Food	Housing <sup>1</sup>	Clothing			Fuel <sup>2</sup>			House- furnish- ings	Sundries	Purchasing Value of the Dollar
				Total	Men's	Women's	Total	Electricity	Gas			
1951 October.....	177.6	235.0	122.7	156.3	175.0	140.6	135.1	90.9	101.7	169.8	164.9	56.3
November.....	179.7	239.8a	123.8	155.1	173.2	139.8	135.5	90.8	102.0	170.4	166.5	55.6
December.....	180.2	239.5b	124.0	154.6	172.7	139.2	135.8	91.0	102.0	170.6	168.5	55.5
Annual average.....	176.2	232.5	120.8	155.0	172.6	140.1	134.4	90.9	101.4	171.7	164.5	56.8
1952 January.....	180.3	240.3	124.5	153.7	171.2	138.8	135.9	91.2	102.1	169.1	168.1	55.5
February.....	177.7	233.9c	124.5	152.7	170.2	137.9	135.8	91.1	102.1	168.7	166.9	56.3
March.....	178.2	234.4d	124.5	152.3	169.9	137.4	135.9	91.1	102.7	167.5	168.2	56.1
April.....	179.9	237.8	124.7	152.1	169.6	137.3	135.9	91.3	103.1	167.5	170.4	55.6
May.....	180.6	240.1e	124.9	151.7	169.0	137.1	133.4	91.4	102.9	166.1	170.7	55.4
June.....	180.8	240.5f	124.9	151.0	168.3	136.2	133.9	91.4	102.9	165.6	171.1	55.3
July.....	182.1r	243.2	125.2r	150.7	168.2	135.9	134.8r	91.3r	102.8	164.8r	172.5	54.9
August.....	182.6r	243.9g	125.6r	150.5	167.8r	135.7	135.8	93.2r	102.8	165.1	173.0	54.8r
September.....	181.7r	241.1	125.6r	150.8r	167.4r	136.6	136.3r	93.0	102.9	165.2	172.9	55.0
October.....	181.6	240.0	126.2	150.5	167.4	136.1	137.9	92.7	102.9	164.4	173.2	55.1
Percentage Changes												
Sept. 1952 to Oct. 1952....	-0.1	-0.5	+0.5	-0.2	0	-0.4	+1.2	-0.3	0	-0.5	+0.2	+0.2
Oct. 1951 to Oct. 1952....	+2.3	+2.1	+2.9	-3.7	-4.3	-3.2	+2.1	+2.0	+1.2	-3.2	+5.0	-2.1

<sup>1</sup> Rents surveyed quarterly for individual cities.

<sup>2</sup> Includes electricity and gas.

<sup>3</sup> Based on food prices for Nov. 14, 1951.

<sup>4</sup> Based on food prices for Dec. 12, 1951.

<sup>5</sup> Based on food prices for Feb. 13, 1952.

<sup>6</sup> Based on food prices for Mar. 12, 1952.

<sup>7</sup> Based on food prices for May 14, 1952.

<sup>8</sup> Based on food prices for June 18, 1952.

<sup>9</sup> Based on food prices for Aug. 13, 1952.

r Revised

still exceeded the October, 1951, figure by 100,000, according to the Bureau of the Census.

The seasonal decline in agricultural workers accounted for the greater part of the decrease. The agricultural total of 7.5 million was 3.6% lower than the September total, and 5.1% below the total for October, 1951.

Nonagricultural employment recorded the slighter decline—approximately 100,000 workers. As a per cent of total nonagricultural employment, the decrease amounted to only 0.2%.

Despite the drop in employment, the number of unemployed (those persons seeking employment) also declined. Approximately 1.3 million were reported to be looking for employment in October by the Department of Commerce. This compares with 1.4 million in September and 1.6 million in October, 1951. The department's estimate for October of this year is the lowest on record since World War II.

### LABOR TURNOVER

The turnover in labor in September moved downward for the second straight month and, in the opinion of the Secretary of Labor, created "one of the most favorable employment situations among workers in manufacturing industries since World War II."

Factories hired fifty-seven new workers for every thousand on the payroll, and laid off only seven. This hiring rate exceeded that of a year ago by 33%.

Layoffs were about half of that recorded since the postwar low set in 1950. The number of people who quit their jobs, however, tended to increase with the expansion of job opportunities. The number of factory workers who voluntarily left their jobs in September was estimated at thirty-five per thousand as compared with thirty per thousand in the preceding month.

### COST OF MANAGEMENT

The total dollar cost of management is greater, of course, in large companies than in smaller ones. But the portion of the sales dollar devoted to reimbursing that management is considerably less in the large companies. The proportion paid tends to vary inversely with dollar sales volume.

An inspection of a selected group of industries from a forthcoming Conference Board report<sup>1</sup> clearly illustrates this fact. (See accompanying chart.) Three companies in the screw machine industry averaging only \$3 million in sales paid 3.7% of the average sales dollar to their management.

Twenty-two metal working machinery companies, whose sales averaged \$25 million, paid out only 1.2% of the sales dollar to management. In the automobile industry, where sales averaged over \$1 billion, management received an average aggregate of .2% of the sales dollar.

<sup>1</sup> A study in preparation on compensation and pensions of executives.

Some striking differences exist in the rates of compensation from industry to industry, but the same pattern is evident in the proportion of sales paid to management. The large companies generally pay higher salaries but they take less of the sales dollar.

### WAGE ADJUSTMENTS

Ninety-six wage adjustments in sixty-nine firms were compiled from the press this month and confirmed by the Board. Of this number, seventy-six covered wage earners. The remainder affected salaried workers. Approximately 400,000 employees were involved in these adjustments, which ranged from 1 cent to 13 cents an hour, or 1% to 9.5%. The most frequent increase given was 10 cents.

Fourteen firms reported that they had received WSB approval for all or part of these raises, while thirty-one indicated that WSB approval was pending at the time they confirmed these contracts. Some settlements do not require WSB approval.

Some significant wage settlements were:

The General Electric settlement with the United Electrical Workers (ind.) granted approximately 39,000 workers a 2.5% tandem raise, plus a 2.6% cost of living adjustment. Westinghouse gave 18,000 employees raises ranging from 7.5 cents to 13 cents an hour.

The U.S. Steel settlement granted 150,000 workers increases ranging upward from 12.5 cents an hour. U.S. Rubber granted 33,000 employees 10 cents an hour.

THOMAS A. FITZGERALD  
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### Management Bookshelf

**Health Resources in the United States—Personnel, Facilities and Services.**—A ready reference and guide which includes an informative chapter on health service in industry. The book reviews the state of the nation's health during the first half of this century, and contains an inventory of health personnel and of resources available to meet the various predominant illnesses of today. By George W. Bachman and Associates, *The Brookings Institution* Washington 6, D.C. 1952, 344 pp. \$5.

**Administering Changes: A Case Study in Human Relations in a Factory.**—The authors made an intensive study of what happened in a factory when a new product was introduced and put into production. From what all employees said and did, the authors have developed generalizations which they suggest may be applied in other kinds of situations in which changes are made. By Harriet O. Ronken and Paul R. Lawrence, *Division of Research, Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts*, 1952, 324 pp. \$3.50.



## Round Table

(Continued from page 456)

pass wages in the North, textile manufacturers move their plants to the South, which is little organized by either of the two major unions. They move south and then create unfair competition in the textile industry by cutting prices.

**MR. BROOKS:** I would like to call attention to a disadvantage of multiplant bargaining which rarely gets the consideration that it deserves.

There is a marked tendency under multiplant bargaining for local unions to wither away. A union starts out with a large degree of local self-determination and local initiative in a community. Then these people and their employers find that for reasons of hard economics it would be advantageous to arrive at a single set of conditions.

In spite of what has been said against multiplant bargaining I find it difficult to think that it is a bad thing. The sort of thing which eliminates the pirating of labor and a too-free movement from plant to plant, which sets conditions which are fair and just and therefore leaves more workers satisfied that they are getting a fair share—all that seems to me to be good. But then what happens is that the central organization, which is built up in order to guide and improve the relationships, gradually absorbs the functions which used to be performed locally.

This is not exactly the same thing which is being referred to as losing contact with the local union. That is another question, because it is possible to maintain contact and still leave nothing for the local union to do. On the West Coast, where we have a uniform labor agreement on a coast-wide basis, and where there is the best of will on both sides, even such things as the local haggling over rate adjustments, which used to be done in the unscientific way, is now done by what they call the "scientific method" of job analysis. The whole job is now taken out of the hands of local officials and put into the hands of the national union's slide-rule boys.

I am quite serious about this. Although some of you may be so unregenerate as to be happy about the withering away of local unions, you ought not to be. There will come a time when you will all agree with me that lively, democratic local unions are desirable institutions.

Therefore, in creating multiplant contracts, and I think it is inevitable and desirable that we should do so, within limits we ought to take the greatest possible pains to see that we do not complicate the thing unnecessarily by getting too centralized. There is too much tendency for company officials to say: "The international man is much easier to deal with. He's a

smart guy. He's reasonable. We've been dealing with him for a long time." That is dangerous philosophy.

### COMPANY-WIDE BARGAINING: PROS AND CONS

**CHAIRMAN BROWN:** In the multiplant company, what advantages and disadvantages do you see in company-wide bargaining?

**MR. STORY:** There is a tendency, not too pronounced yet in our situation, of having policy set at the higher level and imposed on the local plants. There is a tendency of interference with contracts and relationships between local management and local union groups. The ideal, as I see it, is to have the relationship as close as possible on a local basis. The more interference from the top, the more difficulty in working out amicably the relationship at the local level.

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** You mean by that, Mr. Story, that you have local bargaining on all items including money and fringe benefits, or are you referring primarily to seniority and working rules?

**MR. STORY:** I am thinking in terms of all things that are not companywide. For example, horizontal increases normally are the same for all plants. Likewise fringe benefits, such as pensions, normally follow a general plan. A group insurance plan is usually companywide. But there are local matters which do not enter into broad company policy. Those can be worked out on a local basis.

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** I think it is unwise to attempt to standardize all of the working relationships between employees in the union and a big company that has many plants in different areas of the country. I do not see any reason for it.

**MR. FELLER:** No union that I know tries to do it. I know that we do not in the Steelworkers. As a matter of fact, we have different types of relationships with companies, depending on their own internal management structure. There are companies in the steel industry in which the man who runs the plant, whatever his title is, is in charge of his entire setup, including labor relations. We have other multiplant companies in which there is a centralized labor relations setup run from a central city. There the local plant manager is not the boss over his own industrial relations man. The industrial relations man operates out of a central office.

In the second type, our relations are not nearly as good as they are where the companies have a system of dispersal of authority and individual plant managers run their plants from top to bottom on all matters of labor relations. Where that is the case we give our local unions the freedom to go ahead and settle their local problems, such as individual wage rates, seniority, local working conditions and incentive problems. These problems are tremendously important to the

"The exact place to draw the line between the kind of things that are handled by local agreements and the kind of things that are handled by master agreements cannot be prescribed for one reason or another. It was said that there are certain things which are regarded as basic policy, which it is felt ought to be applied from the management side throughout the plants. The same thing goes for the union. There are certain benefits which you think should be contained in the major agreement because they are of general and broad application. Other things you write in local agreements."

Mr. Feller

people in the plant, and we do have better relationships where they are settled on the local level.

#### IS THERE A LEGISLATIVE APPROACH?

**CHAIRMAN BROWN:** What are we going to do about multi-unit bargaining, if anything?

**MR. GWINN:** It seems to me it is perfectly clear that we are going over about the same ground with regard to labor unionism and labor monopoly that we went over in the Nineties and the early part of this century. Then we found industry controlling politics, entering into agreements to fix prices, and other conditions that monopolies always cause sooner or later.

It is perfectly obvious, under the Clayton and the Sherman laws, that if the 600 coal operators got together and in unison fixed the price of coal, or fixed the price of wages, or entered into any other combination affecting the industry and the public interest, they would be prosecuted, sued for triple damages, and stopped generally.

We have in coal a case where industry cannot do anything about it, but John Lewis, a single man, can fix the price of wages for the whole industry and therefore fix the price of coal and enter into an agreement with industry as effectively as if industry itself could enter into it. That not only hurts the public, but it hurts the union and it hurts industry. The people quit buying coal if they have to pay \$17.50 or \$20 a ton to get it. We have labor unions fixing the number of days in a week that men can work. Industry could not do that without being prosecuted. The result is very far reaching.

You can apply that same experience to steel or to other industries that are gradually coming into this area. Because of the need for free economy and competition generally we should bring labor under the Sherman antitrust law, and make unions subject to exactly the same rules as industry. We should bring about local bargaining and do away with the right of any international union officer to conduct negotiations for all the unions in that business. We should

restore local autonomy even though it hurts, even though industry may not like it either. We should restore competition and a free market and rid ourselves from compulsory prices and politics, which is what we are getting into. That is absolutely essential to the health of our economy.

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** Congressman, just what method would you advocate in using the antitrust law on unions?

**MR. GWINN:** Use it as we used it in oil and steel in the beginning when they got to the point where they exercised monopoly control. And interestingly enough, they exercised political control, too. They were subject, under the Clayton Act, to dissolution proceedings. They did break up, for all practical purposes, into autonomous units, and that did the industry a lot of good. So with labor in steel or oil. They could carry on their conventions and use their schools and their common knowledge, but they could not exercise power beyond their bargaining units. They should bargain on a company-wide basis or possibly an area-wide basis in certain industries. I would follow the same procedure as we did in industry. If Mr. Lewis pulled a coal strike on 600 companies at the same time, he would be subject to prosecution and not contempt proceedings to bring him in line. That would enable the coal companies to bargain separately, to come to their own agreements with the local unions.

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** I do not think it will work.

**MR. GWINN:** I would like to know why it would not work.

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** Mr. Taft once said that no law could be enacted to take care of Mr. Lewis. There is another important thing that one of the courts said two years ago: the miners would strike, and have demonstrated they would strike, at the wink or the nod of Mr. Lewis.

I assume that when you say that you would break up industry bargaining, you mean that there would be an injunction which would forbid international unions from passing along information regarding wages.

**MR. GWINN:** No, I did not say any such thing. Industry passes along its information. It has its conventions, its journals, its interchange of ideas, its schools. Of course there would not be any breaking up of that.

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** Then you are coming down to the point where what you would forbid is getting around the table.

**MR. GWINN:** I would forbid industry-wide monopolistic power. Whenever that develops I would not fine Mr. Lewis \$1 million for breaking some order of a judge. I would take him into tow for breaking the law of the nation in exercising compulsory dictatorial power that threatens the national security.



**MR. MUGRIDGE:** You propose, for instance, that the coal industry be split up.

**MR. GWINN:** I would not split it up. I would just say to the Terre Haute company, for instance, "You bargain for yourself and let the union bargain with you." And I would say to the West Virginia group, "You be responsible for your situation and bargain on your own account and decide whether you will strike or whether you won't."

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** Then what would happen to Mr. Lewis if he acted in an advisory capacity and sent a telegram to the local saying, "I do not advise you to accept that offer"?

**MR. GWINN:** Then he would be subject to prosecution for attempting to exercise compulsion with regard to prices and wages, which industry cannot do.

**MR. FELLER:** The notion that it is compulsion if Mr. Lewis says, "You go out and strike," is not true. People strike because they want to strike.

**MR. GWINN:** Why don't they go out before the nod is given them, then?

**MR. FELLER:** Congressman, would you say that the strip mine in West Virginia, which is less efficient, should be able to purchase shovels at a lower price than the mine in Indiana, which is more efficient? You are proposing that the less efficient producer be kept in business, presumably, by paying less for labor than the more efficient producer. I go along with that to a certain extent. As a union, we would make concessions to employers who would otherwise go out of business because we have the jobs of our people at stake and we want to keep them at work.

I agree that any labor union which sits down at a bargaining table and negotiates a uniform price for the product is guilty of a violation of the antitrust law. That is what you are talking about. I have never seen prices bargained in a Steelworkers' bargaining conference. The fact that there are identical price in-

### The Proposed Lucas Amendment

The Lucas amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act provides the following:

(1) Makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to engage in, or to induce or encourage any employer to engage in, a monopolistic lockout. For the purposes of this act the term 'monopolistic lockout' means a lockout or other concerted interference with employment which results from any conspiracy, collusion, or concerted plan of action between competing employers, where the employees of such competing employers do not have a common bargaining representative certified under section 9."

(2) Makes it an unfair labor practice for a union "to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a monopolistic strike. For the purposes of this act the term 'monopolistic strike' means a strike or other concerted interference with an employer's operations which results from any conspiracy, collusion, or concerted plan of action between employees of competing employers or between representatives of such employees, where the employees of such competing employers do not have a common bargaining representative certified under section 9."

(3) Prohibits NLRB certification of a union already representing employees of one employer from representing "employees of any competing employer, unless the employees of such employers whom the representative seeks to represent are regularly less than one hundred in number and the plants or other facilities of such employers at which the representative acts and seeks to act as such are less than fifty miles apart."

The Lucas amendment, however, states it would not "prevent any representatives from being affiliated

or associated, directly or through a federation, association, or parent organization, with representatives of employees of competing employers, if the collective bargaining, concerted activities, or terms of collective bargains or arrangements of such representatives are not subject, directly or indirectly, to common control or approval."

(4) Prohibits competing employers from engaging in "any concerted activities, collective bargaining, or arrangement in the formulation of labor policy for collective bargaining whereby any such competing employer is subject directly or indirectly, to common control or approval of any other competing employer except in the instances mentioned above where the plants and facilities are less than fifty miles apart and the employees of such plants are regularly less than one hundred in number."

(5) Terminates any "existing valid certifications of a common bargaining representative" not consistent with the above provisions at the expiration of one year after enactment of the Lucas amendment or the termination of the contract whichever is sooner.

(6) Unfair labor practices involving violation of the above provisions shall be "given priority over all other cases except cases of like character in the office where it is filed or to which it is referred."

(7) Makes it unlawful "for any employer to engage in, or to induce or encourage any other employer to engage in, a monopolistic lockout, or for any labor organization to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in a monopolistic strike." The section amended by this provision says, "Whoever is injured in his business or property by reason of any violation" of the provision "may sue in any district court of the United States."

"In some large international AFL unions such as the Teamsters, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters, and the Retail Clerks there would be bitter opposition to industry-wide bargaining. There are strong locals in these unions. Some of these are financially better off than the international. They have local officers who are well paid and who want those jobs. The workers want their local autonomy and want to run their own union. Many of the local presidents have more prestige than international officers do. You would have bitter opposition to industry-wide bargaining on that score from these unions."

Mr. Mugridge

creases for profitable companies and unprofitable companies is none of our doing. Would you break us up or prevent us from acting in concert? You would then weaken our position as against the industry but you would do nothing about the admitted monopolistic price practices which give uniform price increases. It seems to me what you are really trying to do is get at monopoly industry by destroying the power of labor. And that will not do it. It would deprive and destroy the balance of power in industrial relations, which I do not think you want to do or at least you should not want to do.

**MR. GWINN:** I cannot understand, Mr. Feller, why you persist in saying that unions operating from Washington make a concession to the local union in West Virginia because the national union in Washington recognizes that there are differences between Terre Haute and West Virginia. Don't the West Virginia boys know enough to know that for themselves? Can't they come to their own agreements with the strip miner in West Virginia? All I am saying is that the national union has got to quit exercising power like that, to make up its mind in its generosity and in its wisdom to permit the little mine union in West Virginia to make a concession to the operator. That kind of compulsion, whether it be in the White House or in Mr. Lewis' house ten miles away, just isn't right. It has to be stopped.

**MR. FELLER:** I want to deal with the word monopoly. We dislike monopoly. That means we like competition. Every time someone says he is against monopoly, I assume that he is in favor of competition. But I always ask: competition between whom?

A manufacturer buys commodities and sells a product. We like to have that manufacturer in competition with other manufacturers who buy commodities and sell products. If they get together to agree on the price of their product, we say it is a violation of the antitrust law.

The competition *vs.* monopoly analogy applies to labor only in one way. We say that we want competi-

tion among the people who supply goods to a manufacturer, and we also want competition among the people who supply labor to manufacturers. People should bid for jobs at different prices, and the man who bids lowest has his labor bought just the same as you buy anybody else's raw material. That analogy is a false one. We have recognized as a matter of social philosophy in this country, as has almost every other country, that you cannot run a reasonable social system in which people bid against each other and adjust wage rates by individual competition. To adopt that concept would mean that we would not have unions because unionism means that the people who are ready to supply labor get together and determine through bargaining how much all labor shall cost. That is the very antithesis of competition for individual labor.

The argument that people should compete with each other by seeing who can drive the hardest bargain with their respective unions has nothing to do with the competition *vs.* monopoly analogy problem. The only analogy is to have two unions competing to supply labor to a given employer and the one who supplied labor at the lowest cost would get the contract. Nobody really wants that. In any event, unions cannot supply labor under the Taft-Hartley Act.

Another argument for antimonopoly legislation to apply to unions is that unions are too strong. Those who use this argument say that the labor union is too strong and therefore we will break it up into pieces and let the individual employer deal with the separate pieces. I submit that in no analysis that I have ever heard of has the case been proven that as against the employer the labor unions are too strong, that they can shove things down the employer's throat. The practical fact, from the point of view of the steel industry and most large industries, is that only by having their various local unions work closely together can the national union even remotely approximate the collective bargaining power that the employers have. To make a case for submitting the unions to the antitrust laws, as would be the case under the Gwin-Fischer bill, you have to prove that point. In the steel industry, it is not true that we are more powerful than the steel companies. You cannot find a case where we put a steel company out of business. With all their strength and power, the United Steelworkers of America have never put the squeeze on the steel industry to the point where its profits were any lower one year than the year before.

**MR. GWINN:** Mr. Feller made me feel badly about Mr. Murray a while ago when he urged the fact that Mr. Murray did not like this power that he has to exercise.

Power, sooner or later, uses government as an instrument by which to facilitate the exercise of that power. And wherever government interferes and becomes the agency by which monopoly power is carried



out, you have not only a public interest involved but you have a fundamental economic and political concern that affects every one of us.

Government power is one of seizure. We have literally seized and confiscated rental property by taking 30% of its value and redistributing it to another economic group. As a result, no one is investing in rental property. In the steel labor dispute, government seized the steel companies' property under a political compulsion that is very great and growing. Private industry dies on the vine because people are not going to invest in companies subject to government seizure and government competition. For years you have seen agitation in Washington to the effect that the industry is so greedy, so selfish, and so short sighted that government is going to have to build more steel plants.

That overshadows completely any temporary gain that comes from the agreement between the unions and industry to quit competition.

We have to put labor unions under the antitrust laws because industry has been able to crawl out from under the Clayton Act by using unions to bring about things of a monopolistic character that they would not dare do as an industrial organization. Let's bring them all under. We are in an absurd position now.

Industry cannot do any of the monopolistic practices that it used to do before the Clayton Act, but, through the act, labor or unions can do all of the things that they used to do. The big difference is that the labor unions control the politicians, and the industrial leaders do not.

**MR. BROOKS:** The answer to the question of what to do about the problems raised by multi-unit bargaining is partly legislative, but not mainly so. We did not mention that one of the very strong pressures toward multiplant bargaining on both sides of the bargaining table came about because the National Labor Relations Board ruled that when a multiplant contract has been established, no separate election will be held for any plant. Therefore, the way in which a union can protect itself from the raids of rival unions is only too evident. For this reason, a great many multiplant contracts are created for the purpose of freezing out the possibility of rival unions rather than because there is any sound economic basis for making that bargain at one time and place.

In my opinion, the trend toward multiplant bargaining has been fostered more by management than by the unions. I agree with the Congressman that it has real hazards, and I have a feeling that there ought

## The Gwinn Bill

The Gwinn bill would amend the Sherman Antitrust Act so that it "shall apply to labor organizations, and to their members acting in concert, in the case of combinations, conspiracies, or concerted activities in or affecting commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, where an object or necessary effect of any such combination, conspiracy, or concerted activity is to:

"(1) interfere with or control production, and interference with or control of production shall include any concerted refusal by employees (otherwise than by leaving their employer's premises on a lawful strike with the bona fide intention of absenting themselves from work until the dispute giving rise to the strike is settled), in the course of their employment to perform such work as is assigned to them on the terms and conditions offered by their employer; or

"(2) restrict or limit the number of individuals who may enter into or follow a particular occupation, trade, or calling; or

"(3) control or fix prices that employers may charge for their goods or services; or limit the amount of goods any employer may produce, sell, or distribute, or the amount of any services any employer may render, except by engaging in a lawful strike for another object; or limit the area in which, or the persons to whom, any employer may sell or distribute goods or render services, or from whom

any employer may acquire goods or services; or limit the number of employers who may engage in any particular business, or for whom members of any such labor organization will perform work, except by a lawful strike for another object; or

"(4) impose any featherbedding practice on an employer, and the term 'impose any featherbedding practice' shall include causing or attempting to cause an employer to:

"(a) employ any person or persons in excess of the number of employees required by such employer to perform actual services; or

"(b) pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other thing of value for services which are not performed or not to be performed or for services which are not required by such employer; or

"(c) pay or agree to pay more than once for services performed; or

"(d) place any restrictions or conditions upon the purchase, sale, or use of any product, material, machine, equipment, or service for any purpose prohibited by this act."

The bill also amends the Sherman Antitrust Act so that it shall be illegal in any industry or activity affecting commerce:

"(1) For any employer to conspire or act in concert with any other employer in the matter of wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other terms

or conditions of employment which either shall propose to his employees, or negotiate or otherwise make effective with respect to his employees;

"(2) For any employer (herein called the 'first employer') to conspire or act in concert with any labor organization, or for any labor organization to conspire or act in concert with the first employer, in either case for the purpose of (i) preventing another employer from proposing, negotiating, or otherwise making effective with respect to his employees certain wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other terms or conditions of employment or (ii) causing the employees or the representative of the employees of such employer not to accept his proposals;

"(3) For any labor organization which is currently representing employees of one employer with respect to the wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other terms or conditions of employment of his employees, to represent or attempt to represent employees of any other employer with respect to their wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other terms or conditions of employment;

"(4) For any labor organization (herein called the 'first labor organization'), to conspire, combine, or act in concert with any other labor organization, irrespective of whether or not such other labor organization belongs to or is affiliated with the same labor organization or federation of labor organizations of which the first labor organization is a local, affiliate, or other constituent part, in the matter of wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other terms or conditions of employment, which either shall propose to, or seek to have made effective by, any employer with respect to his employees, unless such labor organizations are respectively certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the representatives of the employees of the same employer in different bargaining units, or unless such labor organizations jointly represent the employees of a

single employer, and such combination, or act is limited to such particular employer."

The penalty for violation of the above would be a "fine of not more than \$5,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, in the discretion of the court."

The Gwinn bill would also amend the Taft-Hartley Act so that "no unit shall include the employees of more than one employer, irrespective of whether or not such employer has with one or more other employers combined, formed an association, or designated a representative for the purpose of dealing with employees or their representatives unless the employees of such employers have their places of employment in a common metropolitan district and do not number more than five hundred: Provided, however, that two or more employers who are affiliated through stock ownership or otherwise and who, by reason of such affiliation, may lawfully act in concert with one another for all purposes without violating the antitrust laws may be deemed one and the same employer. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section 9, any labor organization that is the representative of employees of any employer may, within one year after the date of enactment of this act, designate any constituent unit of such labor organization, or any other labor organization with which such labor organization is affiliated, as the representative of such employees, and such constituent unit or other labor organization shall thereupon succeed to the rights of such labor organization as the representative of such employees and to the rights of such labor organization's collective bargaining agreement then in effect between it and such employer. For the purposes of this section the term 'metropolitan district' means an incorporated city, town, or other municipality and the area contiguous thereto, bounded by a line which at any given point thereon is not farther than twenty-five miles from the point nearest thereto on the boundary line of such city, town, or municipality."

to be limits put around it. But I do not know how to accomplish that legislatively without laying on a heavier bureaucratic hand than we now have.

I would suggest as a first step a retreat by the National Labor Relations Board from the process of giving minute and detailed supervision to the collective bargaining process. Then I would suggest that we try to see whether or not it is possible for us to come more nearly—if we must have multiplant bargaining—to the British system of bargaining. Then the fact that bargaining is conducted on a national basis does not confer special power on any particular labor organization.

**MR. STORY:** As far as I am concerned, industry-wide bargaining per se is not wrong. I am only concerned with the results which are contrary to the public interest. When research and analysis indicate

what these bad results are, then I would attempt to control them. However, I would not try to legislate out industry-wide bargaining unless that was the only way that you could protect the public interest.

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** Any additional labor legislation is abhorrent, for all legislation is for the purpose of controlling something, and eventually it restricts freedom. And if Congress is going to endeavor to pattern the type of bargaining in this country, I am afraid that we are in for real class conflict.

When you start restricting unions, when you say you want to break up these big unions so that an international officer cannot communicate with local unions, cannot pass along information to them, sooner or later you are going to have the same restrictions on industry.



The British system, which Mr. Brooks cited, came about voluntarily. We must be careful not to carry legislation to a degree which would leave little or no freedom for either labor or industry. That would be regimentation, and I am sure we do not want that. There are many things that are worse than these big strikes, including compulsory arbitration. We certainly need to keep labor relations out of politics. It must come out of politics if we are going to make progress, and many unions realize this as well as other people in the country.

### QUESTIONS FROM FLOOR

**QUESTION:** What is the connection between multi-unit bargaining and inflation?

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** Multiple bargaining or industry-wide bargaining may be quite essential in the future because some day the labor movement has got to look at this inflationary wage problem.

Somewhere along the line, the unions may come to a realization that you cannot go on increasing wages and increasing prices; that somehow or other these wage increases have to be tied to increased productivity.

**MR. MILLING:** Multi-unit bargaining is not the primary cause of inflation. The primary cause is the economic law of supply and demand. When demand is far in excess of supply, naturally we have inflation, naturally we come down to a 51-cent dollar, which is approximately what we have today. Multi-unit bargaining is not the primary cause. It may be a contributing cause. Government intervention also has something to do with it. Labor and management can and should settle these things at the collective bargaining table without government intervention. Too much government intervention is a contributing cause to inflation in that it establishes wage patterns that must be followed by all whether or not there is any economic ability to meet increased costs without hiking prices.

There have been references to the English system of collective bargaining. This system is founded on the English economic system of cartels and monopolies. It is the English system that has ruined England. It is the American system of competition that has made America the greatest and most powerful country in the world today.

**MR. FELLER:** If you make a sober analysis of the economic effect of industry-wide bargaining, you will probably find that the larger the bargaining unit the less the inflation. As a matter of fact, economists argue that the net effect of unions in inflationary periods is to keep wages down. It is a very difficult kind of charge to answer because if you agree, you have lost your membership, and if you disagree you have lost the argument.

The simple fact is this. If you talk to one manu-

"When the parties are confronted with the Wage Stabilization Board which nationally publicizes week after week the kinds of settlements that are being made, there is virtually no leeway left either to the management or to the union as to what they will do. When the parties know that all they can get approved is a certain amount, the tendency is to bargain that amount or to try to get an exception to that fixed amount.

"We will see a very rapid increase in pattern bargaining and in industry-wide and multiplant bargaining unless we can find a way to get rid of controls."

Mr. Brooks

facturer and say, "You ought to keep your prices down because if you raise them you are going to cause inflation," you know what he will say. "Is it my business to control the economy? I am in business. When we all get together, sure, then we will all keep them down, but not me." The same thing is true with labor. The larger the labor organization the more it has to take into account the ultimate economic consequences of what it does. For that reason the CIO could be in favor of wage stabilization. I doubt that an individual unit in an individual plant could go to its membership and say, "We don't think we ought to get a wage increase because it would be unstabilizing or inflationary." The CIO, however, can say that because its people are consumers and it is large enough to look at their interests as consumers.

One of the problems in an inflationary economy is that certain firms in certain industries make big profits. They are in favorable, strategic locations. The sky is virtually the limit. Now, when the sky is the limit for their prices, the sky is the limit for what they will pay in wages. An individual plant that is making a particular kind of steel useful to defense can, without controls, raise its prices and raise its wages. Industry-wide bargaining or pattern bargaining stops that because we are all geared to the tail end. To the extent that it has any effect, the larger the bargaining unit the less the inflationary effect.

### ARE PUBLIC UTILITIES A SPECIAL PROBLEM?

**QUESTION:** Are we to understand that the discussion today has not even remotely dealt with the problems of labor relationships in the utility industries, railroads, and matters of that kind? It does not seem to me that they have been touched upon in the slightest degree today.

**MR. BROOKS:** We did talk about utilities and especially Consolidated Edison in New York. There is no one in this world more sensitive than union leaders to the dangers and risks involved in shutting down, for any reason, a utility company or the railroads. The

implication that unions are not concerned with the public interest, that they don't care, is completely against the facts. It always surprises me that people keep pressing these issues. If you want to talk about power, in one sense the Consolidated Edison local has more power, in my opinion, than the Steelworkers' union. It could paralyze New York City in ten minutes. Do you think it will? Do you think they don't care? It is silly to talk about irresponsibility of the kind which is implied by some of the questions we have had about this unreasonable and unbounded power of labor.

**QUESTION:** Isn't the reason that the Consolidated Edison union does not call a strike because it knows that within a day or two its leaders would either be in jail or in a very, very tough spot and their control would be broken?

**MR. BROOKS:** You could put it that way, if you want to. I would rather think, knowing some of them personally, that that is not the way it is. I think that they are just as much concerned that the babies get their milk as you are, sir.

#### UNIONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

**QUESTION:** Do labor groups go into conferences with employers determined that they are going to keep in mind the public interest, and that they are going to make an honest and earnest effort to reach a contractual agreement so that strikes will not come about?

**MR. BROOKS:** Speaking from my observation, I think I would be a little dishonest if I said that we keep the public interest constantly in mind. I think you would just brand me a phony if I said that at no stage in our negotiations do we make a settlement without thinking about how it is going to affect the consumers. I don't think we do. I don't think management does. I think the thing is difficult enough already without adding that dimension to it. We have a basic devotion to the public interest in the sense that all responsible citizens do.

We approach our negotiations with a desire to get a settlement. Most of the time we do get a settlement. Sometimes when we don't, it is our fault, and sometimes it is management's fault. We should be as tolerant as we can of people who do not get settlements, because the circumstances sometimes have much more to do with the inability to get a settlement than does the relationship between the parties. I do not know how much statesmanship it would take to keep the textile industry peaceful at this point. I do not know whether it is conceivable to have that much statesmanship. The most important thing said here today was by Mr. Mugridge, and it is directly connected with this. There are many things far worse than strikes.

**MR. FELLER:** If a union leader pulled a strike

"We are going over about the same ground with regard to labor unionism and labor monopoly that we went over in the Nineties and the early part of this century. Then we found industry controlling politics, entering into agreements to fix prices, and other conditions that monopolies always cause sooner or later." Mr. Gwinn

that all his people did not want, he would infinitely prejudice his position because all unions are essentially democratic, even those that do not have the trappings of democracy, in the sense that the leader is a leader only so long as the people regard him as a leader. As soon as that stops, he stops being a leader and he loses his position.

From the technical standpoint, there is often the problem of persuading his membership that they have to strike to uphold the union's strength in bargaining. The hope is always that in that way you establish a sufficient showing of strength so the employer will make the offer that is positively his highest offer—that there isn't a holding back—and that you will get an agreement. The threat of the strike is the thing that makes collective bargaining work on both sides. The individual strike may be over a picayune thing, but to show that that threat is there so that there can be agreement next time, you exercise the right to strike. The classic example is the New Jersey bus operators. They had the right to strike and didn't strike for sixteen years. Then the lawmakers put a compulsory arbitration statute on the book and the bus drivers have been having strikes ever since.

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** Don't discount the loyalty to and the respect for the union on the part of the members. They are probably more loyal to the union itself than they are to its leaders. That accounts primarily for Mr. Lewis' strength. The discipline in the United Mine Workers is most effective. They have had their ups and downs and they have great respect for their union, and they will back it.

**CHAIRMAN BROWN:** May I add a footnote to what Mr. Mugridge just said. One of my favorite quotations is from the introduction to a book written in 1929, in which the following statement appears: "The United Mine Workers are currently fighting a losing battle for existence."

**MR. MILLING:** A strike is a last resort. After every other means has been used, the strike is practically the only weapon of the union. It is like the atomic bomb. You do not want to use it, but if necessity forces its use, you go ahead. A strike is like a war. Nobody wants it. Everybody suffers from it, but sometimes you must have it.

**MR. STORY:** Somebody must decide that the de-



mands are reasonable. Let's go back to the question that was asked a little while ago about inflation. Suppose the demands are considered too high by the employer? He has to say no. The unions say, "We've got to have it." There is an impasse and there is a strike.

There is no measuring stick for what is really a fair wage. It is how much the union will take; how much they want to ask for. There are only three answers to a union which asks for things which are unreasonable and inflationary: (1) judicial bargaining—that is the recognition that the union should not ask for too much or it is going to be criticized by public opinion; (2) the balance of power theory, where the economic powers of the parties become more closely in balance, and as a result, the bargaining demands will be reasonably made and reasonably met; and (3) strict governmental interference such as compulsory arbitration.

In the final analysis, the reasonableness of the union's demands and the reasonableness of the company's attitude form the true basis for reaching an agreement. Now, where these two factors don't co-exist, agreements are not reached. When strikes result, then public opinion functions. It decides who is right and who is wrong. Somehow, public opinion always does manage to function in time.

#### WHAT SHOULD CONTRACT COVER?

**QUESTION:** I would like to quarrel with two of the members of the panel representing management, and with Mr. Feller.

I grasp from them that they all, for perhaps different reasons, were very critical of having but one set of contractual conditions for all the plants represented in multiplant bargaining. That to me is based on the fallacious theory that all your working conditions are in your agreement.

Mr. Story seems to feel that there are perhaps important policy principles that he would want to see protected in the master contract or the group of agreements. Then there are other matters which he could leave to be settled at the local level.

Mr. Mugridge said almost the same thing.

Mr. Feller said the unions were happy to have quite a bit of freedom—in fact they were happy to have complete freedom—to bargain differently and come to different agreements, and they were far happier where that situation existed.

"What we are talking about when we discuss industry-wide bargaining is something that may jeopardize our economy. In reality we are not talking about industry-wide bargaining . . . but about concentrated power as a result of big unions and big business. The problem is: Is this bigness a threat to our economy and to our life?" Mr. Mugridge

I wish they would comment and clear that point for me: what should be the coverage of the union contract?

**MR. STORY:** My experience has been that basic things should be determined at the home office. For instance, we have plants that are referred to by the Secretary of Labor as Communist dominated. Union security for a Commie-dominated union is one thing we do not leave to local bargaining. But as to holidays, for example, we leave that to local bargaining as one locality may have different holidays than another. What we do is to allow our local plant management as much autonomy as possible within the framework of broad company policy.

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** Four years ago I was close to multiple bargaining involving two companies and twelve local unions. The international came in and said, "This year we're going to clean out all these local practices. We are coming out of here with a contract that covers everything. We're fed up on all these local disputes." They worked two weeks on that. At the end of about two weeks the president of the union came over and said, "You know we are in a hell of a mess and we cannot continue with bargaining unless you agree to tear up the records that were taken of all the things we talked about. Our people are saying, 'You think you are going to take that away from us? We'll tell you you're not!'"

**MR. FELLER:** The funny thing is that we are all in agreement here. The exact place to draw the line between the kind of things that are handled by local agreements and the kind of things that are handled by master agreements cannot be prescribed for one reason or another. It was said that there are certain things which are regarded as basic policy, which it is felt ought to be applied from the management side throughout the plants. The same thing goes for the union. There are certain benefits which we think should be contained in the major agreement because they are of general and broad application. Other things are written in local agreements, or not included at all.

#### NARROWING OF THE SKILLED-UNSKILLED GAP

**QUESTION:** I asked an old-time manager who had been managing a fairly large plant what was the rate paid the sweeper in the plant in 1907 and what was the rate paid the top toolmaker. The toolmaker, he told me, was paid around 50 cents an hour and the sweeper was paid around 7 to 9 cents an hour. This was back in 1907.

What I am trying to say is that industry wage negotiations tend to force upon industry the same rate of increase for each job classification, which means eventually that the incentive for the individual is gone. That is, it is getting more and more difficult to get men to go into training to become toolmakers, or pre-

pare for other highly skilled jobs. I feel that some real effort should be made on the part of both management and unions to get the differentiations between the high skills and the low skills widened.

**MR. FELLER:** This is a very real problem for unions as well as management. Speaking again about steel, we have a job classification program which we have jointly worked out. In the recent wage increase, for example, we got a 12.5-cent general wage increase, while 3.5 cents was used to increase the increment between job classes so as to maintain the percentage relationship between our skilled people and our basic labor rate. The percentage relationship today is about what it was when we established the job classification system.

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** I think it should be noted, too, that unions do not do all these things. They do not necessarily set wages. We have been through a couple of long periods—we are in one now—of full employment, and we are bidding for this labor. Also, there is the fact that the percentage of unskilled people today, in comparison to 1907, is much greater. When you start to bid for labor, it does not make any difference what labor it is, you automatically increase the price of labor. We are doing just that now.

#### IS LOCAL BARGAINING BETTER?

**QUESTION:** Mr. Feller, I believe you made the statement that your relationships in the steel industry were better with companies where the labor relations man at the local level reported primarily to the local management rather than somebody in a central position. Why is that?

**MR. FELLER:** There is a causal relationship. It goes back to what is put in the contract. There are many things one does not put in the contract that become rules of policy. You cannot settle an agreement at a local level when it goes all the way back to the home office because the people at the top level start thinking about all the other places and fear the agreement will set a policy. The answer, then, is that it is not settled. Where labor relations are handled on a local level, only the particular situation and its consequences need be considered.

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** It is advantageous, too, isn't it, because it keeps the local union virile?

"Nobody is worried when the Operative Potters Union signs an industry-wide agreement. They have had one for fifty years now. Nobody cares about that. On the other hand, if the Consolidated Edison local union in New York City were to strike, you would be just as much concerned about it as you would be about a coal strike." Mr. Brooks

**MR. FELLER:** Yes, advantageous to us.

**QUESTION:** I was wondering if that close relationship in a plant would not have the tendency to develop better communications and therefore, because of that, better labor relationships. I was wondering if that might not be one of the reasons.

**MR. FELLER:** That very well might be one.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Mugridge, can you get a more intelligent approach to some basic problems from the international union than you can from the local union?

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** I do not believe so. I find throughout the country many wonderful local leaders whose intelligence in some cases I think is much greater than that of the national leaders.

**QUESTION:** There is a productivity clause, for example, in the General Motors contract which is rather forward looking. Is that an illustration of what you can get through bargaining with an international as against a local?

**MR. MUGRIDGE:** No. I think the productivity clause in the General Motors contract and in fact the whole five-year contract was a very smart thing for General Motors and for the public. It was negotiated because General Motors the previous year had courage enough to take a good long strike and the union knew that it was in a position where it had to accept some things it probably did not want to accept. That is one of the values of a strike. I think that industry doesn't have enough big strikes to equalize the strength of the employer as against that of the union.

#### Management Bookshelf

**The Supervisor's Role**—Seven industrial relations directors from the electric utility industry have joined forces in this presentation. Each has described the role of supervision in a different area of work with people. Although written with electric utilities in mind the material is sufficiently general to be of interest to all those concerned with supervisory problems. *Featured in the November 17, 1952 issue of Electrical World.*

**Executive Development**—The subject is discussed comprehensively on the basis of the experience of the fifty firms included in the author's survey. This report outlines the scope of a fairly comprehensive program, suggests a philosophy for it, and outlines means to accomplish the necessary action.

Companies already engaged in executive development will be able to check their programs against the consensus of the fifty organizations surveyed. Those who have not yet begun may see what is considered necessary and important by others. *By John W. Riegel, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1952, 369 pp. \$6.*



# Wage Adjustments Announced Prior to November 15, 1952

Company	Type of Worker <sup>1</sup>	Increase			Remarks
		Amount	Date Effective	Number Affected	
<i>Chemicals and Allied Products</i>					
Monsanto Chemical Company Everett, Mass.	WE	3%	6-15-52	750	New contract also grants paid sick leave plan to supplement group insurance benefits. Individual job rate adjustments, benefits, approved by WSB. Contract expires 6-15-53. (Int'l Chemical Workers, AFL)
Springfield, Mass.	WE	\$.01 hr.	10-19-52	1,500	Increment is quarterly cost-of-living adjustment under existing long-term contract. (IUE-CIO)
Glidden Company Buena Park, Calif. Vegetable Oil Division	WE	\$.03 hr.	6-19-52	25	Contract expiration brought increase. Prior to settlement, minimum wage rate was \$1.31, first effective 8-26-51. Some increases, reclassifications subject to WSB approval. Automatic wage reopenings 12-18-52, 6-18-53, 12-15-53 in proportion to BLS index from 5-15-52. Contract expires 6-18-54. (Int'l Chemical Workers, AFL)
<i>Electrical Machinery, Equipment and Supplies</i>					
Bendix Aviation Corporation Red Bank, N. J.	WE	See Remarks	8-11-52	See Remarks	Following a 14-day stoppage, a general 4¢ an hour increase was granted 923 employees. Of these, 123 received a 5¢ skilled trade increase, while 6½¢ was secured as inequity by 194 workers. Additional benefits granted increased vacation pay after 15 years' service. Increase and benefits subject to WSB approval. Wage reopening 8-12-53; contract indefinite unless reopened. (IUE-CIO)
	S	\$7 mo.	8-11-52	246	Benefits, conditions, same as above. (No union)
Capehart-Farnsworth Company Fort Wayne, Ind.	WE	See Remarks	See Remarks	864	Effective 6-1-52 hourly rated employees received 5¢; 1-1-53 they will receive an additional 4¢. Minimum hourly wage was \$1.43. New contract also grants Good Friday as paid holiday, and improved insurance benefits with company paying for improvements. Fringe benefits received approval except for 2½¢ cost-of-living clause; raise requires WSB approval. Union agreed to divisional seniority set-up. Wage reopening 6-1-53, 1-1-54; contract runs 2 years. (United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, ind.)
Capitol Records, Inc. Scranton, Pa.	WE	\$.055 hr. average	6-23-52	287	Raise subject to WSB approval. Previous hourly minimum was 85¢, effective 6-22-50. (Int'l Ass'n Machinists, AFL)
General Electric Company Interstate	WE	See Remarks	9-15-52	39,000 approx.	Raise came on anniversary date of continuing contract, granting 2.5% on tandem arrangement, 2.6% as cost-of-living. Raise, and a more liberalized insurance benefit plan, are subject to WSB approval. Next reopening 3-15-53; contract expires 9-53; if not notified it becomes a continuing contract. (UERMWA, ind.)
Hunter Fan & Ventilating Company Memphis, Tenn.	WE	\$.05 hr.	7-28-52	350	First contract has provision for wage reopening 7-28-53. Previous hourly minimum was 90¢. Contract runs 2 years. (IUE-CIO)
I. T. & T. Interstate	WE	\$.12 hr. average	9-10-52	4,700	Contract expiration was followed by 2 day work stoppage. Increment subject to WSB approval. Wage reopening 9-10-53, contract runs 2 years. (IUE-CIO)
The Magnavox Company Fort Wayne, Ind.	WE	\$.07 hr.	6-1-52	950 approx.	Wage reopening in continuing contract also grants improvement in life and hospitalization insurance with all additions paid by company. Previously, hourly minimum was \$1.30, effective 1-1-52. Next wage reopening should have been 1-1-53, but 4¢ was agreed on during June negotiations. Contract expires 6-1-53. (UERMWA, ind.)
	S	5% approx.	7-1-52	553	Converting percent notation to cash, \$12.50 was minimum raise per employee. Previous monthly minimum was \$150, effective 6-1-51. Same arrangement as above. (No union)
Westinghouse Electric Corporation Interstate	WE	See Remarks	10-1-52	18,000	Raise ranged from 7½-13¢ hourly. WSB approval required for portion of increment in excess of that permissible under existing self-governing regulations. (UERMWA, ind.)

# Wage Adjustments Announced Prior to November 15, 1952—Continued

Company	Type of Worker <sup>1</sup>	Increase			Remarks
		Amount	Date Effective	Number Affected	
<b>Fabricated Metal Products</b>					
Aluminum Company of America . . . . Interstate	WE	See Remarks	See Remarks	4,700	New contract dated 8-18-52 granted 10% increase 8-10-52, 4¢ an hour 7-1-52. Previously, hourly minimum was \$1.22, effective 10-2-50. Shorter periods required for 3 weeks' vacation, increase in shift premiums, sickness, accident and hospital benefits, bonus class earnings, were among fringe benefits granted. WSB approval received for wages and benefits. Wage reopening 8-18-53; contract tenure 1 year. (UAW-CIO)
Detroit Brass & Malleable Works . . . . Detroit, Wyandotte, Mich.	WE	See Remarks	8-1-52	See Remarks	New contract, following expiration of old one, grants hourly raise of 2¢ to 550 employees, varying amounts between 3½¢-8½¢ to 100 skilled workers. Other benefits: increased holiday pay rate, vacation pay for 15-year employees; employees' dependents health insurance paid for by firm. Entire package approved by WSB. Wage reopening on 60-day notice, contract tenure 1 year. (UAW-CIO)
Overmyer Mould Company . . . . . Interstate	WE	\$ .05 hr.	9-1-52	246	New contract, following 6 day work stoppage, increased all prevailing base rates by 2½¢ an hour. In addition, all listed minimum rates, journeymen and apprentices were increased by 5¢ an hour. After application of the above, all prevailing base rates were increased 5%. Fringe benefits include 2 days off for death in family, 3rd week vacation for 15 years, shift differential of 4¢ and 6¢, improved insurance privileges. Entire package subject to WSB approval, due to change in bargaining unit. Contract ends 1st Monday in Sept. '53. (Flint Glass Workers, AFL)
Rockwell Manufacturing Company . . . . Barberton, Ohio	WE	\$ .10 hr.	8-1-52	355	New contract also grants change in method of computing vacation pay, double time for seventh consecutive day worked, 1 hour increase in call-in pay, company to pay for time lost in grievance meetings. Fringe benefits, 7½¢ of increase require WSB approval. Contract runs 1 year. (District 50, UMW-ind.)
United States Pipe and Foundry . . . . Birmingham	S	See Remarks	See Remarks	45	Office employees benefited from Birmingham Molders' Union settlement with firm. They received 6.68% raise 5-5-52, \$3.50 a month 10-1-52. Also got three weeks' vacation with pay for 15 years' continuous service. Raise and benefits subject to WSB approval. (No union)
<b>Food and Kindred Products</b>					
San Francisco Bakery Employers Association . . . . . San Francisco, Calif.	WE	\$ .10 hr.	5-1-52	616	Employees also received 3 weeks' vacation after 15 years, night shift premiums increased 1½¢ an hour (new hourly rates 15¢ 6 to midnight, 23¢ midnight to 6 A.M.). Previous hourly minimum was \$1.235 since 5-1-51. Entire package approved by WSB. Contract expires 5-1-53. (Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Int'l Union, AFL)
<b>Furniture and Fixtures</b>					
DeLuxe Metal Furniture Company . . . . Warren, Pa.	WE	\$ .10 hr.	8-13-52	140	Two day work stoppage after expiration of contract. Previous hourly minimum was \$1.225, in effect since 8-13-51. Half of raise subject to WSB approval. Contract expires 8-13-53. (UE, ind.)
Edison Wood Products Company . . . . New London, Wis.	WE	See Remarks	9-1-52	See Remarks	New contract grants 145 workers 4¢ hourly increase, 58 workers 3¢, and 27 workers 2¢. Next wage reopening 1-1-53, contract tenure 1 year. (United Furniture Workers, CIO)
<b>Leather and Leather Products</b>					
Ohio Leather Company . . . . . Girard, O.	WE	\$ .05 hr.	6-24-52	456	Under new contract company assumes premium payment on life, accident, health and surgical insurance, and hospitalization, also 1 additional paid holiday. Earlier hourly minimum was \$1.31, since 6-24-51. Approval required, granted for benefits. Wage reopening 6-24-53. Contract expires 6-24-54. (Int'l Fur & Leather Workers, ind.)
<b>Machinery (Except Electrical)</b>					
American Monorail Company . . . . . Cleveland, O.	WE	\$ .02 hr.	10-1-52	250	Increase granted in wage reopening. Previous hourly minimum was \$1.39, in effect since 4-1-52. Wage reopening at any time. Contract tenure 1 year. (UERMWA, ind.)



# Wage Adjustments Announced Prior to November 15, 1952—Continued

Company	Type of Worker <sup>1</sup>	Increase			Remarks
		Amount	Date Effective	Number Affected	
Dexter Folder Company ..... Pearl River, N. Y.	WE	2½%	6-1-52	230	WSB approval has been received for raise, and for some fringe benefits. Cost-of-living wage reopening 12-1-52; contract tenure 1 year. (Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, AFL)
	S	2½%	6-1-52	59	Raise, benefits, same as above. (Office Employees' Int'l Union, AFL)
Foote Bros. Gear & Machine Corp.... Chicago, Ill.	WE	See Remarks	6-13-52	See Remarks	Following contract expiration and 1 day work stoppage, 1,188 employees received a 6¢ hourly increase. Of this group 265 received an additional 5¢ an hour inequity adjustment. The number of paid unworked holidays was increased from 6 to 7, and the company agreed to pay for eye examinations, and prescription-built safety glasses. WSB approval pending for entire package. Contract expires 6-13-53. (IUE-CIO)
	S	\$2.40 wk.	6-13-52	308	(No union)
McNally Pittsburg Manufacturing Co. Pittsburg, Kan.	WE	\$0.07 hr.	8-5-52	300	First union contract after 9 week work stoppage also granted 6 paid holidays, time and a half for Saturday when paid holiday fell within that work week. Previous hourly minimum was \$1.05. Entire package subject to WSB approval. Contract runs 2 years, reopening 8-4-53. (UAW-AFL)
National Motor Bearing Company, Inc. Redwood City, Calif.	WE	\$0.08 hr.	8-11-52	350	Settlement followed 1 week stoppage. Previous hourly minimum \$1.44, effective 12-24-51. Fringe benefits granted 1½¢ for job inequities, 5½¢ pension. Increase and benefits subject to approval. Automatic 4¢ increases 8-1-53, 8-1-54, 8-1-55. Contract expires 12-1-55. (UAW-CIO)
<i>Paper and Allied Products</i>					
Bemis Bag Company ..... Vancouver, Wash.	WE	\$0.08 hr.	8-4-52	160 approx.	New contract followed 1½ day work stoppage. Previously, female workers' minimum was \$1.135, males' \$1.40, since 3-3-52. Company also agreed to pay half the cost of group hospitalization and surgical insurance. Increase and fringe benefits subject to WSB approval. Wage reopening 2-1-53; contract expires 7-31-53. (Int'l Bro. of Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers, AFL)
Brown Paper Industries Company ... Monroe, La.	WE	\$0.02 hr.	8-1-52	187	Previous hourly minimum was \$1.15½. Easter Sunday and Thanksgiving Day were granted as holidays, with the former subject to WSB approval. Wage reopening between 2-1 and 3-1-53. Contract expires 8-1-53. (Int'l Bro. of Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers, AFL)
Chase Bag Company ..... Toledo, O.	WE	\$0.07 hr.	See Remarks	150	After contract expiration, strike ran from 6-16-52 to 7-23-52. New contract signed 8-28-52, retroactive to 7-23-52. WSB approval required for 3½¢ of raise. Contract expires 6-15-53. (United Textile Workers, CIO)
Kieckhefer Container Company ..... Parkersburg, W. Va.	WE	4%	8-18-52	115	New contract also includes Blue Cross Employee coverage, subject to WSB approval. Previous hourly minimum was \$1.02, in effect since 12-15-50. Wage reopening in 6 months. Contract expires 5-1-54. (Int'l Bro. of Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers, AFL)
Morris Paper Mills ..... Illinois	WE	\$0.02 hr.	8-26-52	600	Increase is cost-of-living arrangement plus contract expiration. Previous hourly minimum was \$1.26½, first effective 2-26-52. Fringe benefits granted 4 weeks' vacation after 30 years, 3 days' funeral leave, subject to WSB approval. Wage reopening 2-26-53; contract tenure 1 year. (Int'l Bro. of Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers, AFL)
Oxford Paper Company ..... Rumford, Me.	WE	\$0.04 hr.	7-14-52	2,936	New contract also grants 3 additional paid holidays (total now 6), assumption by company of ½ premium cost for employees hospitalization insurance. Previous hourly minimum was \$1.31, effective 1-1-52. Increase is cost-of-living type permissible under GWR 8. Fringe benefit approved. Wage reopening after 1-16-53, contract expires 7-16-53. (Dist. 50, UMWA, ind.)
	S	2.77%	7-14-52	312	(No union)
Wall Paper Institute ..... Interstate	WE	\$0.015 hr.	9-1-52	3,000-3,500	Increment, within cost-of-living formula, raised male workers' minimum to \$1.335 an hour, women to \$1.11. Wage reopening 3-1-53; contract expires 8-31-53. (United Wall Paper Craftsmen & Workers, AFL)

# Wage Adjustments Announced Prior to November 15, 1952—Continued

Company	Type of Worker <sup>1</sup>	Increase			Remarks
		Amount	Date Effective	Number Affected	
Wausau Paper Mills ..... Brokaw, Wis.	WE	\$.01 hr.	6-17-52	410	New contract also grants change in differential rates from 0-5-8 to 0-6-10 for 8 hour shift workers, from 0-0-5-8 to 0-0-10-11 for 6 hour shift workers, all subject to WSB approval. Previous hourly minimum was \$1.23, effective 12-16-51. One reopening permitted on 60 days' notice. Contract expires 5-31-53. (Int'l Bro. of Paper Makers, AFL; Int'l Bro. of Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers, AFL)
	S	1%	8-16-52	75	Previous monthly minimum for salaried employees was \$150. (No union)
<i>Products of Petroleum and Coal</i> Allied Chemical & Dye Corporation ..	WE	\$.05 hr.	See Remarks	n.a.	New contract grants hourly increases on deferred schedule. 5¢ on 6-29-52, 6-29-53 and 6-29-54. Contract tenure 3 years. (Dist. 50, UMWA, ind.)
<i>Primary Metal Products</i> Acme Steel Company ..... Chicago, Ill.	WE	See Remarks	n.a.	2,400	Contract expiration and 11 week stoppage preceded adjustment. Previous hourly minimum was \$1.31, effective 12-50. Raise comes to 12½¢ hourly, plus ½¢ job increment for each additional job class. Shift premiums of 6¢ and 9¢ granted, 3 weeks' vacation after 15 years, 6 paid holidays annually. Wage reopening 5-1-53. Contract expires 6-30-54. (United Steelworkers, CIO)
	S	9½%	7-1-52	1,300	Previous weekly minimum, effective 11-15-50 was \$38. (No union)
Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. .... Detroit, Mich.	WE	\$.04 hr.	10-15-52	800	Raise was preceded by wage reopening, new contract and 2 month stoppage. Cost-of-living increment of 2¢ effective 9-1-52. Previous hourly minimum was \$1.38, effective 9-29-50. New benefits granted 3 weeks' vacation after 15 instead of 20 years, increased disability benefits. Entire package subject to WSB approval. Contract expires 10-15-53. (UAW-CIO)
U. S. Steel Corporation ..... Interstate	WE	See Remarks	3-1-52	150,000	Following 54 day work stoppage after contract expiration, company gave from 12½ to 28¢ an hour, plus 5¢ an hour in South. Earlier minimum was \$1.31 an hour since 12-1-50, \$1.21 in South. Also granted: 6 paid holidays, 3 weeks' vacation for 15 years service, 6¢-9¢ shift differentials. Raise, benefits approved by WSB. Wage reopening 5-1-53; contract expires 6-30-54. (United Steelworkers, CIO)
	S	See Remarks	See Remarks	7,500	This group received 10.53% 3-1-52, 2.45% 7-26-52. Effective 12-1-50, bi-weekly minimum had been \$93. (United Steelworkers, CIO)
<i>Professional Scientific and Controlling Instruments</i> Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Company	WE	\$.12 hr.	9-1-52	1,400	New contract grants increased insurance, hospitalization, special services and vacation benefits. Raise, fringe benefits subject to WSB approval. Prior hourly minimum was \$1.11, effective 9-17-51. Cost-of-living wage reopening 3-1-53, contract tenure 1 year. (Federal Labor Union, AFL)
Knoxville, Tenn.	S	See Remarks	10-16-52	250	Raise grants \$20 a month to employees subject to overtime, 9% to those who are not. Previous monthly minimum was \$150, in effect since 10-1-51. (Hotel & Restaurant Employees, AFL)
Metric Metal Works ..... Erie, Pa.	WE	\$.04 hr.	8-1-52	734	Two-day work stoppage followed contract expiration. Graduated adjustments in vacation plan were granted, plus 1 additional holiday. Raise permitted under GWR 8, benefits subject to WSB approval. Contract expires 7-31-53. (IUE-CIO)
Projection Optics Company ..... Rochester, N. Y.	WE	\$.02 hr.	8-15-52	15	This cost-of-living adjustment, result of a wage reopening, also granted employees hospital, surgical and term life insurance benefits. Previous hourly minimum was 85¢. Fringe benefits approved by WSB. Contract runs 1 year.
<i>Public Utility</i> Ohio Edison Company ..... Akron, O.	WE	\$1.151 hr.	7-1-52	2,084	Increase came after expiration of old contract. Previous hourly minimum was \$1.02½. Insurance, liberalized sick leave, hospitalization and surgical benefits were also granted. Raise and benefits subject to WSB approval. Wage reopening 7-1-53; contract runs 2 years. (Utility Workers, CIO)



# Wage Adjustments Announced Prior to November 15, 1952—Continued

Company	Type of Worker <sup>1</sup>	Increase			Remarks
		Amount	Date Effective	Number Affected	
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., North Calif., Nev.	WE	\$3.432 wk. average	8-3-52	11,141	Severance pay increased for short-service employees, wage differential for Christmas and New Year's Eve work increased. Latter approved by WSB as well as raise. Contract expires 8-2-53. (Communications Workers, CIO)
Texas Gas Transmission Company, Fairbanks, La.	WE	\$1.15 hr.	7-1-52	See Remarks	New contract also grants minor fringe benefits. Prior to settlement, hourly minimum was \$1, effective 12-5-50. Raise and benefits subject to WSB approval. Contract tenure 1 year. Of 976 employees, 411 are union members. (Int'l Chemical Workers, AFL)
	S	9% approx.	7-1-52	249	Previously monthly minimum was \$150, in effect since 5-1-50. (No union)
Union Electrical Company of Missouri, St. Louis, Mo.	WE	See Remarks	7-1-52	See Remarks	Settlement, result of a wage reopening, granted 11½¢ an hour to 1,173 power plant employees, of which 6¢ is subject to WSB approval. Previous minimum was \$1.45 an hour, effective 7-1-51. A 7% hourly increase was granted 1,432 outdoor employees, whose previous minimum was \$1.385 an hour, effective 7-1-51. Same raise was given 50 employees in the Mound Plant, where the previous hourly minimum was \$1.44 since 7-1-51. WSB approval is required for 4% of the raise. Permission granted for doubling the 40-day sick-leave maximum for power plant employees. Contract expires 6-30-53. (Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, AFL; Int'l Bro. of Electrical Workers, AFL; Allied Crafts, AFL)
	S	7%	7-1-52	1,219	Contract expires 6-30-53. (Int'l Bro. Electrical Workers, AFL)
Rubber and Allied Products Armstrong Rubber Company, New Haven, Conn.	WE	\$1.10 hr.	8-18-52	644	Wage reopener in continuing contract received WSB approval 10-27-52. Previous minimum \$1.36 an hour, effective 8-27-51. Contract expires 4-30-53. (United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, CIO)
The Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, Interstate	WE	\$1.10 hr.	See Remarks	See Remarks	New contract grants raise, effective 8-18-52, to 25,356 union members, and to 1,386 nonunion factory employees, whose previous minimum was 98¢ as of 8-1-51. Effective 8-1-52, 135 nonunion office employees, whose hourly minimum since 8-1-51 was 84¢, also received the raise. Fringe benefits granted were: changed hourly schedules, vacation arrangements. WSB approval pending for entire package. Wage reopening on 30 days' written notice, negotiations to begin within 10 days thereafter. Contract subject to cancellation upon 30 days' written notice on or after 6-10-54. (United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, CIO)
	S	See Remarks	8-1-52	5,191	Raise granted 5% or \$17 a month. Previous monthly minimum was \$145, effective 8-1-51. (No union)
Gates Rubber Company, Denver, Col.	WE	\$1.10 hr.	8-14-52	3,500	Increment granted on wage reopening of continuing contract. Approved by WSB as tandem arrangement. (United Rubber, Cork, Plastic & Linoleum Workers, CIO)
	S	5%	8-14-52	2,500	Same as above. (No union)
The Kelly-Springfield Tire Company, Cumberland, Md.	WE	\$1.10 hr.	8-13-52	2,002	Raise is tandem adjustment in wage reopening. 30 of total number employees not involved in bargaining unit. WSB approval received 10-20-52. Wage reopening on 30-day notice by either party, 60-day notice to start negotiations. Contract expires 3-1-53. (United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, CIO)
Mohawk Rubber Company, Akron, O.	WE	\$1.10 hr.	8-18-52	806	Increase came in wage reopening previously agreed on in contract. Prior to settlement, hourly minimum was \$1.05, effective 4-8-50. Raise subject to WSB approval. Contract expires 4-7-53. (United Rubber, Cork, Plastic & Linoleum Workers, CIO)
Seiberling Rubber Company, Barberton, Carey, O.	WE	\$1.10 hr.	8-8-52	1,640	Increase came in wage reopening in still-continuing contract. Next reopening anytime on 60-day notice. Contract expires 9-1-53. (United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, CIO)
	S	See Remarks	8-1-52	865	Raise is either \$17 a month or 5%. (No union)



# Wage Adjustments Announced Prior to November 15, 1952—Continued

Company	Type 30 Worker <sup>1</sup>	Increase			Remarks
		Amount	Date Effective	Number Affected	
United States Rubber Company ..... Interstate	WE	\$1.10 hr.	8-11-52	33,257	Increment followed wage reopening. Half of total was permissible under GWR 8, remainder approved by WSB. Reopening on 30 days' notice. Contract expires 3-31-53. (United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, CIO)
<i>Stone, Clay and Glass Products</i> Federal Glass Company ..... Columbus, O.	WE	\$1.10 hr.	9-1-52	900	Following contract expiration, work stoppage lasted from Sept. 5-11, 1952. Earlier hourly minimum was \$1.24 for men, \$1.16½ for women, effective 9-1-51. New benefits grant 3 weeks' vacation after 15 years, and 1¢ increase in firm's contribution to insurance payments. Fringe benefits, and 6¢ of raise subject to WSB approval. Contract runs 1 year. (Flint Glass Workers, AFL)
Kimble Glass Company ..... Muncie, Ind.	WE	\$1.10 hr.	9-1-52	352	Following 6-day work stoppage, increment was granted, as well as 4¢ and 6¢ shift differentials, 3 weeks' vacation after 15 years' service, 2 days off with pay for death in family, improved group insurance. Prior to settlement, hourly minimum was \$1.30, effective 9-4-51. Fringe benefits and 5½¢ of increase subject to WSB approval. Contract expires 9-6-53. (Flint Glass Workers, AFL)
Owens-Illinois Glass Company ..... Toledo, O. Libbey Glass Division	WE	\$1.10 hr.	9-1-52	1,043	Contract expired 1st Monday in September, followed by 6 day work stoppage. In addition to raise, fringe benefits granted were: increased vacation pay to employees with 15 years' service, shift differential of 4¢ and 6¢, payment for 2 days' absence for death in immediate family, holiday pay for holiday in vacation period, increased benefits in group insurance plan. Fringe benefits, 6¢ of raise, subject to WSB approval. Contract runs 1 year. (Flint Glass Workers, AFL)
Universal-Rundle Corporation ..... New Castle, Pa.	WE	\$0.07 hr.	3-26-52	380	Wage reopening granted raise, 3 weeks' vacation after 15 instead of 20 years' service. Previous hourly rate \$1.415. Next reopening 3-26-53, contract tenure 1 year. (Nat'l Bro. of Operative Potters, AFL)
Redlands, Calif.	WE	\$0.07 hr.	6-16-52	173	Wage reopening granted raise, 3 weeks' vacation after 15 instead of 20 years' service. Previous hourly rate \$1.525. Next reopening 6-16-53; contract runs 1 year. (Nat'l Bro. of Operative Potters, AFL)
<i>Textile Mill Products</i> Armstrong Cork Company ..... Camden, N. J.	WE	\$0.058 hr.	9-26-52	210	New contracts signed after previous contracts expired. Previous hourly minimum \$1.39, effective 12-7-51. Under new plan company to pay premiums for group life, health, accident and hospital benefits insurance; 2 weeks' vacation after 3 instead of 5 years. All increases and benefits subject to WSB approval. First wage reopening 4-1-53, second opening before contract expires 3-26-54. (United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, CIO)
Gloucester, N. J.	WE	\$0.053 hr.	9-12-52	67	Previous minimum \$1.35 an hour, effective 12-7-51. Under new plan company pays premium for group life, health, accident and hospital benefits insurance. Increase and fringe benefits subject to WSB approval. Reopening 6-1-53, negotiating 2nd opening; contract expires 9-30-54. (United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, CIO)
Fulton, N. Y.	WE	\$0.05 hr.	8-15-52	371	New agreements come in wake of contract expiration. Prior hourly minimum was \$1.32, effective 12-3-51. Fringe benefits grant longer vacations, increased holiday and weekend pay. WSB approval granted for 3¢ of raise, 2¢ and fringe benefits subject to approval. Wage reopening 6-15-53, 12-15-53; contract terminates 8-15-54. (Textile Workers Union, CIO)
Lancaster, Pa.	WE	\$0.05 hr.	8-28-52	3,027	Previous hourly minimum \$1.31 effective 12-3-51. Under new contract, company will pay premiums for group life, health, accident and hospital benefits insurance, 2 weeks' vacation period after 3, rather than 5, years; increase night shift differential from 9¢ to 10¢ and pay average earnings rather than straight time for paid holidays. Increase and benefits subject to WSB approval. Wage reopening 5-1-53, 2-1-54; contract expires 11-1-54. (United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, CIO)



# Wage Adjustments Announced Prior to November 15, 1952—Continued

Company	Type of Worker <sup>1</sup>	Increase			Remarks
		Amount	Date Effective	Number Affected	
Bemis Bros. Bag Company . . . . . St. Louis, Mo.	WE	5%	8-18-52	390 approx.	Previous hourly minimum 89¢, effective 11-12-51. Contract runs through 8-19-53. (Textile Workers Union, CIO)
Columbus Coated Fabrics Corporation Columbus, O.	WE	\$.04 hr.	10-16-52	n.a.	Raise is an annual improvement factor in a continuing contract, independent of escalator clause. Contract expires 10-16-53. (Textile Workers Union, CIO)
The Landers Corporation . . . . . Toledo, O.	WE	See Remarks	See Remarks	n.a.	Firm granted two raises: 3¢ an hour cost-of-living 7-28-52, 5¢ an hour annual improvement 9-1-52. Contract expires 8-31-53.
Mohawk Carpet Mills, Incorporated . Amsterdam, N. Y.	WE	\$.11 hr.	3-1-52	180	Increment came as part of wage reopening in continuing contract. Previous hourly minimum \$1.17, effective 7-2-51. WSB approval received 9-16-52. Wage reopening 1-1-53; contract expires 6-1-53. (Textile Workers Union, CIO)
	S	See Remarks	3-1-52	23	Salaried employees received hourly raise on basis of 40-hour week. (No union)
<i>Transportation</i> Missouri-Pacific Transportation Co. . . St. Louis, Mo.	WE	See Remarks	10-1-52	256	New contract grants \$.004 increase per bus mile, also \$1 daily differential for suburban service, 5¢ extra for each U.S. mail pouch carried, 20 miles per hour delay en route permitted, increase in tire changing allowance. Previous minimum for first year drivers was \$.054 per bus mile. Part of increase which exceeds cost-of-living allowance subject to WSB approval, as are all benefits. Contract runs 1 year. (Bro. of Railroad Trainmen for Motor Coach Operators, ind.)
San Antonio Transit Company . . . . . San Antonio, Tex.	WE	See Remarks	7-1-52	See Remarks	Settlement granted 11¢ an hour to 107 skilled mechanics, while 603 bus operators and others received 10¢ an hour. Since 7-1-51, skilled mechanics received hourly minimum of \$1.56, bus operators and others \$1.40. Three weeks' vacation now granted after 25, instead of 30 years. Skilled mechanics category needs WSB approval for 3½¢ of raise, bus operators and others for 2½¢. Contract expires 6-30-53. (Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees, AFL)
	S	6.21%	7-1-52	139	Same benefit for general employees. (No union)
<i>Transportation Equipment</i> Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. . . . . Terre Haute, Ind.	WE	See Remarks	8-20-52	445	Hourly shift differentials granted 5¢ to second, 3¢ to third, plus a general 10¢ increase added to all hourly rates. Previous hourly minimum was \$1.28 (including 19¢ cost-of-living adjustment), effective 7-1-52. Subject to WSB approval. Contract tenure 3 years. (UAW-CIO)
	S	\$17.30 month	n.a.	55	(No union)
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation Eddystone, Pa.	WE	See Remarks	1-24-52	250	New contract granted 17¢ hourly to employees whose earnings were over \$1.73, 20¢ to those who earned less. Previous hourly minimum was \$1.36, since 1-24-51. Employees were also granted group insurance plan paid for in full by company, 3 weeks' vacation after 15 instead of 25 years, and payment for holidays as such regardless of day on which holiday falls. WSB approval pending for entire package. Contract runs 1 year. (Int'l Bro. Electrical Workers, AFL)
	WE	See Remarks	2-16-52	7,028	Hourly increase is greater of either 10% or 12½¢. Previous minimum was \$1.235, effective 1-24-51. Employees received improved group insurance plan with entire cost borne by company, 3 weeks' vacation after 15 instead of 25 years, and payment for holidays regardless of day on which holiday falls. Raise approved by WSB, fringe benefits pending. Wage reopening 9-10-53; contract tenure 2 years. (United Steelworkers, CIO)
	S	See Remarks	2-16-52	911	Increments, fringe benefits same as above. Previous hourly minimum \$1.045, effective 1-24-51. (United Steelworkers, CIO)
Fruehauf Trailer Company . . . . . Phoenix, Ariz.	WE	\$.08 hr.	6-29-52	25	Previous hourly minimum was \$1.74, effective 6-29-51. WSB approval required for raise. Wage reopening 6-23-53, contract expires 6-23-54. (IAM-AFL)

## Wage Adjustments Announced Prior to November 15, 1952—Continued

Company	Type of Worker <sup>1</sup>	Increase			Remarks
		Amount	Date Effective	Number Affected	
International Harvester ..... Milwaukee, Ore.	WE	\$0.04 hr.	3-3-52	71	First labor contract. Effective 8-15-51, minimum hourly wage was \$1.72. Raise preceded by 54-day work stoppage. Firm also granted three 30-day steps in automatic progression, waived 1951 attendance requirements for 1952 vacation qualification. WSB approval pending for 4¢ area inequity pay, fringe benefits. Contract expires 8-23-55. (UAW-CIO)
	S	See Remarks	3-1-52	45	Salaried employees whose monthly minimum was \$1.70 since 8-15-51 received either 3% or 4¢ an hour minimum. (No union)
North American Aviation ..... Los Angeles, Calif. Columbus, O.	WE	\$1.10 hr.	4-28-52	38,200	Raise is part of wage reopening in continuing contract which terminates 10-22-53. Minimum effective 10-24-50 was \$1.10 plus 14¢ cost of living. Half of increase approved under GWR 6 sec. 1, half under GWR 6 sec. 4. (UAW-CIO)
	S	6%	4-28-52	6,700	No WSB approval required. Previous monthly minimum was \$315 effective 10-24-50, plus \$24.25 cost of living. (No union)
<i>Miscellaneous</i> Gimbel Bros. .... New York, N. Y.	WE	See Remarks	See Remarks	See Remarks	Contract signed 8-15-52 gave 2,452 employees \$3 increase, effective 3-3-52, added \$2 progression rates affecting 641 workers, effective 6-2-52. Fringe benefit approved by WSB, granted additional 2½% for general medical care. Wage reopening 3-1-53 and 3-1-54; contract terminates 2-28-55. (Distributive, Processing and Office Workers, ind.)
McKesson & Robbins, Incorporated. Fresno, Calif.	WE	\$16 mo.	3-26-52	29 approx.	Settlement brought about after contract expiration. Contract expires 3-26-53. (Office Employees' Int'l Union, AFL)
Minneapolis Iron Store ..... Minneapolis, Minn.	WE	\$0.05 hr.	1-1-52	60	Settlement is part of a new contract, which expires 1-25-53. (Office Employees' Int'l Union, AFL)

WE, wage earner; S, salaried employee.

n.a., not available.